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ABSTRACT
The study examines the mechanism of policy formulation 
and locational decision-making as it relates to the provision of 
transport infrastructure and specifically port-oriented coal 
transport infrastructure in southern New South. Wales.
The analysis reveals that traditional geographic theori 
and positivist decision-making models are simplistic and do not 
accurately account for location decision-making. Rather it was 
found that location decisions, as well as implementation are, in 
fact, a product of complex political processes.
The study demonstrates that even when coordinated and 
integrated planning does occur for the provision of transport 
infrastructure, the implementation stage of the decision-making 
process is disjointed and uncoordinated and reflects the 
incremental nature of the implementation stage of the process.
Incrementalism reflects the inability or reluctance of 
Government to act or to provide resources sufficient for the 
completion of the policy plan. It reflects, also, the role of 
powerful vested interest groups on decision-makers. The study 
revealed that pressure may be exerted by influential lobby and 
interest groups, including trade unions, and that their 
participation may prove sufficiently powerful to force modifi­
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CHAPTER Is INTRODUCTION
This study focusses on the mechanism of locational 
decision-making and its spatial implications and falls within 
the general methodological framework of decisional analysis. 
More particularly, it is concerned with an analysis of those 
locational decisions which are associated with the provision 
of transport infrastructure and specifically with port-oriented 
export coal transport infrastructure. The study argues, with 
Grant(l), Logan(2), Muir and Paddison(3) and others, that the 
location of facilities, public institutions and utilities, for 
example and, in this case, of transport infrastructure, may 
not - indeed, certainly does not - reflect simply the interplay 
of economic variables but rather is the direct outcome of 
political processes, "....of political power or clout in the 
form of an influential citizenry, lobby, politician or organi­
sation ...."( 4 ) . It argues further, that to properly and ade­
quately understand and explain these processes, it is necessary 
to seek a conceptual framework which is somewhat more appro­
priate than that of the simplistic positivist decision-making 
model. The study develops such a framework and uses it to 
examine the complex processes which have resulted in the pro­
vision of coal-related transport infrastructure in southern 
NSW focussing on the port of Port Kembla.
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This introductory chapter falls into three parts. The 
first focusses on some of the more fundamental aspects of 
changes in paradigms and perspectives within the discipline 
generally and within transport studies particularly; on chan­
ges that suggest the increasing importance of a decision­
making, conflict-oriented and power-based approach to the 
explanation of some locational problems. The treatment is, 
quite purposely, brief and selective. A small number of 
recent papers have documented the general paradigm changes 
quite thoroughly and indicated very clearly the directions 
with which this study associates itself - see, for example, 
Logan's elegantly argued 'post-covergence' p a p e r (5), Muir and 
Paddison's cohesive statement in their 1981 publication(6) 
and Grant's earlier paper (1977), including a valuable summ­
ary of the 'Theories of urban policy m a k i n g ' (7). Nor does 
this brief review explore the many contributions being made, 
particularly in urban sociology and in political science (8).
The second section outlines the origins of the empirical 
problem upon which the study focusses and formulates a number 
of working hypotheses about which the study is oriented.
The third section reviews briefly the overall structure 
of the thesis and the emphases within each chapter.
A. LOCATION DECISION-MAKING: SOME BACKGROUND COMMENTS 
Decision-making; an Emerging Focus in Geography
The mechanistic framework of classical location theory 
had, of course, little to say about real world complexities 
of plant and facility location. Interestingly, though the
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weight-gain, weight-loss notions of Weberian analysis and the 
narrow reliance on cost-trade-offs between procurement and 
distribution costs have for some time been recognised as hav­
ing little more than heuristic value, there persisted for a 
considerable time a remarkably narrow, normative and non 
real-world approach to the explanation of industrial and 
facility location.
Growing dissatisfaction with the limiting assumptions of 
classical location theory and with its failure to account for 
real-world patterns led, through the 1960s, to efforts to 
modify the rationality assumptions of the earlier models and 
to seek to construct models which recognised the stochastic 
nature of human behaviour. Wolpert, in the vanguard of this 
move, in 1963, for example, demonstrated that optimum location 
decisions are not made in order to maximise profit but that a 
human element prevents rational choice behaviour. Wolpert 
was influenced by the economist Simon and like him, compared 
man's decisional behaviour with the concept of 'economic man'. 
'Economic man', he argued, possessed omniscient powers of per­
ception, rationality and the single goal of optimum returns 
and maximum p r o f i t (9).
Wolpert's study of the decision-making behaviour of 
Swedish farmers indicated that only in exceptional cases was 
the concern of the decision-maker, in this case the indivi­
dual farmer, with the discovery and selection of optimum 
returns. The majority were concerned with the discovery and 
selection of satisfactory alternatives. He found that profit 
maximisation was not achieved and that the concept of the
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spatial satisficer appeared more descriptively accurate of 
the behavioural pattern of the sample population than the nor­
mative concept of 'economic man' (10). It was found that con­
cern was with alternatives and decisions which are 'good 
enough' rather than with finding optimum solutions.
Research subsequently undertaken by Wolpert led to a re­
cognition that location processes were often conflict ridden 
and that location patterns were, in fact, the outcome of bar­
gaining between groups. Although he does not pursue plural­
istic theory, he does allude to the complexity of and the 
political element inherent in location decisions. He suggests 
that "...participants in locational decisions are often groups 
where relative organisation, sophistication and power develops 
through the decision process, and where interests are often 
conflicting but interdependent"(11).
Golledge, Brown and others further explored locational 
choice within a behavioural and probabilistic framework, 
suggesting that it was necessary to explore the motivations 
of decision-makers in their choice of locations rather than 
concentrating simply on the topological relationships between 
locations. However, while the general approach sought to 
clarify the 'why' of decision-making, particularly in respect 
of the individual's choice-making behaviour, and to model it, 
often in probabilistic terms, it revealed nothing of the 'how' 
of decision-making within the broader social framework(12).
The dominance of Logical Positivism within the disci­
pline led, in fact, to an allegedly rational model of 
decision-making where all possible alternatives and
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consequences of each is examined before the choice of action. 
Furthermore, the decision-maker, when making his choice, can 
transcend all political and ethical biases and his judgement 
is objective, value-free, and divorced from any ’external' 
influences such as pressure from political or vested interest 
group sources.
The actual mode of scientific explanation followed the 
form of logical deduction or what Hempel(13) describes as the 
Deductive Nomological form of explanation where the event to 
be explained is logically deduced from a number of initial 
conditions and a set of appropriate universal laws. Harvey, 
in suggesting the relevance of the new method in geography 
states that "...there is no logical reason for supposing that 
theory cannot be developed in geography or that the whole 
battery of methods employed in scientific explanation cannot 
be brought to bear on geographic pr o b l e m s (14).
Despite Harvey's shortlived optimism, when the scienti-' 
fic method is applied to location theory a number of problems 
arise, including that of the alleged impartiality of the 
decision maker and the feasibility to consider all possible 
information before making a choice. Because initial re­
search into a problem begins with a process of induction and 
because it is not feasible or possible to collect all 
possible data, the researcher must know a priori what parti­
cular information is acceptable. Hence the researcher 
begins with an innate bias and a preconceived idea of what 
is relevant and what is not. Consequently, only those find­
ings may be recorded as being relevant which are consistent
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with the researcher's own interests and which are compatible 
with the paradigm.
When the scientific method is applied to location theory 
it necessarily becomes a 'rational' process; to : 
'scientifically' explain transport location and infrastruc­
ture changes, for example, emphasis is placed on economic 
rationalisation of the development, on cost benefit analyses, 
on the widespread use of models as explanatory tools and on 
the spatial processes associated with the development of a 
transportation system. Any 'non-rational' elements, such as 
vested interest group and political pressures are not incor­
porated since they cannot be explained by and hence are not 
applicable in terms of a rational theory. There occurs, there­
fore, an inconsistency and incompatibility between the 
positivist method of location decision-making analysis and the 
actual real-world process. This incompatibility stems from 
the allegedly objective nature of the process and the apparent 
inequity which are consequences of that decision-making 
process - less socially desirable facilities or activities, for 
example, are more likely to be concentrated in urban areas of 
lower socio-economic status where little or no opposition to 
their construction might be anticipated. The incompatibility 
further reduces the explanatory power of the scientific method 
of explanation as a technique or method since it does not in­
corporate or recognise the existence of personal biases of the 
decision-maker and cannot be called upon to explain inequities 
which result from biased decision-making.
The failure of the 'spatial scientists' to resolve these
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apparent problems led, in due course, to a reaction, in^- 
itially from a small group of 'radical1 and Marxist geogra­
phers, but later from a much larger group concerned with 
questions of welfare and equity. This reaction has not con­
stituted a revolution in Kuhnian t e r m s (15) though it has 
resulted in a new trend. It differs from conventional 
research within the spatial paradigm because, although the 
new school investigated location and locational decisions, 
emphasis was not on economic variables and conventional cost/ 
benefit analysis, for example, but on location as the product 
of a political process and on the social and economic in­
equity which resulted from that process. As fundamental 
questions asked by the 'radical' theorists were not explicable 
in terms of the spatial science paradigm, solutions and 
answers were sought beyond the paradigm.
It is widely accepted among the proponents of the new 
school that location decisions are politically determined; 
that social and economic inequity exists spatially and that 
discrimination occurs against less influential groups. This 
discrimination occurs particularly, though not only, in the 
areas of education, the location of noxious facilities and 
highway location and maintenance(16).
The interest of Marxist geographers in decision-making 
is not primarily in the process of decision-making per se but 
with the consequences of that process. They generally hold 
that Governments are major decision-makers and that some in­
fluence of pressure groups occurs but the actual decision­
making mechanism or the 'how' of decision-making tends to be 
ignored.
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Recently 'conflict' has become an important focus in 
the spatial literature, particularly in attempts to explain 
aspects of urban structure. Cox(17), as a leading proponent 
in this emphasis, has discussed social issues and inequities 
which result from policy and location planning as they are 
reflected in urban housing policies, welfare and pollution as 
well as discrimination which occurs in the areas of education, 
the location of noxious facilities and freeway and highway 
location. He suggests that Governments and politicians play 
a vital role in urban change, though his concern is not 
decision-making as a process, nor specifically how decisions 
are made. Rather, his interest is the effect of decision­
making - that is, the urban spatial organisation of facilities 
and resultant social inequities. Logan makes a similar point 
when he suggests that "...Cox's conclusions are obvious and 
superficial as an explanation of urban development processes.
He 'explains' the spatial pattern but not why it happens in 
social or political t erms"(18).
More recently C o x (19) has suggested that further research 
into the 'conflict' theme requires the development of a well 
articulated theoretical structure which he attempts to provide. 
Despite the fact that his conceptual framework is incomplete 
and that the relationship between conflict and the ̂ decision- 
making process is not always clear, Cox argues that political 
and pressure group elements are part of locational conflict 
although he does not investigate the actual mechanism and pro­
cess of locational decision-making (see Chapter 2).
There has emerged, then, a growing emphasis in the
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discipliné on -the need for more adequate examination of the 
decision-making process. There has emerged, too, a realisa­
tion that it may be necessary to look outside the discipline 
for concepts and a framework for interpreting locational 
decision-making as an inherently political process. In this 
respect M u i r (20), Muir and P a d d i s o n (21), Logan(22), Wise(23), 
Grant(24) and others have looked to more recent discussions 
in sociology and political science and there has emerged, in 
their work, at least in tentative form, a conceptual framework 
for location decision-making based to a greater or lesser 
degree, on the notion of pluralism. Since some of these basic 
propositions are important in later discussion, a brief diver­
gence is in order.
In the context of political science D a h l (25), an influen­
tial proponent of modern pluralistic theory, has argued that 
rather than a single elite dominating all urban policy making, 
a series of elites dominate issue areas. The political 
leaders, or elites, are the major policy makers and they are 
influenced in their choice of action by pressure groups. He 
rejected the notion that in a democratic society the ruling 
elite dominate policy making and instead claimed that policy 
making was carried out by a plurality of participants. In his 
case study of New Haven, Dahl noted that although oply a small 
number of persons have direct influence, in the sense that • 
they successfully initiate or veto proposals for policies, 
policy makers are nevertheless influenced in their choice of 
action by pressure groups, notably the voter. It was found 
that a symbiotic relationship exists between the policy maker, 
the governing body, and the voter as the influence of the
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constituents in a sense determines policy as politicians may 
initiate policies compatible with the demands of the voter in 
order to gain support of the electorate. Similarly, the 
results of elections may be interpreted by leaders as indica­
ting a preference for or an acquiescence in certain lines of 
p o l i c y (26).
The notion of policy making as an interplay between 
Government and pressure groups has been supported by 
Lindblom(27) who believes that policy is made through a com­
plex process in which a number of participants exert varying 
amounts of power and influence. In fact, Lindblom describes 
the processes as a 'play of p o w e r ' (28) in which co-operation, 
bargaining, persuasion and other techniques and influences 
from various bodies with diverse and often conflicting in­
terests, interact to resolve issues and to produce solutions.
Further, Lindblom believes that the actual implementation 
of policy occurs by way of an unending sequence of incremental 
steps, described as the strategy of 'disjointed incremental­
ism' (29). According to this conceptualisation, decisions are 
made through minor incremental moves on a particular problem 
rather than through a comprehensive and major reform 
p r o g r a m m e (30). The process is both disjointed and incremental 
as all relevant aspects of a policy plan are not implemented 
simultaneously and sections of any part of a plan may be im­
plemented as a crisis occurs independent of related require­
ments .
There has, however, been considerable reluctance on the 
part of geographers to pursue these themes and even political
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geographers, as Logan notes, "...steadfastly avoid studying 
the political basis of society in the wide, non- 
institutionalised, power-focussed sense now being adopted by 
political scientists and sociologists"(31). Social 
scientists, as well as political geographers, he suggests, 
"...should identify the power structures... define the values 
and aspirations of each group in the structure... (and) pro­
pose appropriate policy and a c tion"(32). Thus, in a new 
political geography "power, conflict and decision-making will 
be the crux of (a) new behaviouralist approach, with social 
justice being the normative stance adopted"(33). That this 
approach is not only adequate but even mandatory to properly 
explain some aspects of Melbourne's urban structure and 
pattern is well demonstrated in Logan's recent studies.
'Power' and 'conflict' are, however, elements within the 
more general and dynamic process of decision-making; power 
relations are fundamental to it and conflict, rather than 
being an unexpected or unusual 'side-effect', as Cox's em­
phasis tends to suggest, is simply an integral part of it.
It is the decision-making process in toto, which must become 
the focus for study, not the particular components of it.
In a recent work, Muir and Paddison(34) have adopted 
this particular point of view and have incorporated group 
theory into a comprehensive conceptual framework for location­
al decision-making in which political and interest group par­
ticipation are essential elements in the decision-making 
process. Decisional analysis they argue, "...is appropriate 
to situations in which the researcher seeks detailed and
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comprehensive answers to questions concerning how particular 
interventions into the real world system have been formu­
lated. It is essentially a dynamic ...form of analysis"(35). 
Muir and Paddison further suggest that it is "...the dogged 
pursuit of the question 'why' (which) ...leads to the pains­
taking analysis of each stage in a decision process and 
requires an accurate assessment of the actors, their informa­
tion and goals, the way that information is perceived and 
evaluated and interactions within and between the a c t ors"(36) . 
Decisional analysis, moreover, may also "...include percep­
tion and power analysis, while structural functional analysis 
of institutions and their spheres of competence may be 
necessary ...as a foundation for dynamic analysis"(37),
(see Chapter 2) .
Decisional analysis, as it seeks to explore and under­
stand the complex relationships between the elements in the 
decision-making process, the decision itself and the spatial 
implications of that decision, offers a rich field for 
geographic research. Certainly, to understand the location­
al processes involved in the development of port-oriented 
transport infrastructure, which is the purpose of this study, 
the analytical approach offered by decisional analysis is 
enticing. In the following section it is shown that there 
has been, in transport studies in geography, a growing concern 
for an adequate understanding of the decision-making process, 
though only tentative beginnings have been made.
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Decision-Making and Transport Studies
Not surprisingly, explanation in transport studies and 
discussion of the locational patterns of transport infra­
structure, have mirrored the emphases of current paradigms. 
Although Eliot Hurst pointed out with some exasperation in 
the early 1970s, that Cooley as early as 1894 recognised that 
transport systems could not be examined without consideration 
of their "...socioeconomic framework or operational m i l i e u " (38), 
little attention had been paid to the intricacies of 
decision-making and political processes in transport infra­
structure and facility location - or for that matter, in 
transport studies generally.
Meinig's(39) work on the development of railnets in the 
Columbia Basin in the US and in South Australia marked, 
however, something of a departure from a mechanistic frame­
work for though it was essentially an historical and compara­
tive study, notably in the Sauer tradition, it made explicit 
mention of the importance of non-physical, social and 
organisational factors. Meinig suggested that although 
terrain was a factor in route selection, he suggested that the 
importance of physical features determining the general 
pattern of the railroad network could easily be exaggerated 
and that decisions on route selection were not dictated by 
the obvious lineaments of the l a n d (40).
His empirical studies showed that in almost every example 
of route alignment which he investigated, feasible alterna­
tives had existed for the specific route of the railroad
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extensions and that the local communities had exerted con­
siderable influence in determining route location. In the 
Columbia Basin, community pressure had been exerted by means 
of monetary contributions and donations by citizens of land 
upon which to erect the railway extensions. In South 
Australia, influence was exclusively by way of 'political 
pressure'(41).
Although Meinig does not explicitly state the nature of . 
the 'political pressure', it is apparent that the location 
decisions were neither morphologically nor economically deter­
mined. Moreover, pressure from community groups with vested 
interests were certainly influential elements in the ultimate 
location choice.
Somewhat later than Meinig's study, Eliot Hurst(42) 
called into question the adequecy of Logical Positivism as an 
appropriate paradigm within which to explore aspects of trans­
portation geography. He underlined the importance of social 
and political,,as well as economic and spatial processes and 
argued that it was necessary to "...look at the socio­
economic reality within which transportation geography is 
studied and transportation systems operate". He further 
argued that "...the socio-economic reality is at least equally 
important as the mechanistic analyses, and yet very little 
attention is paid to i t " (43). Despite Eliot Hurst's plea there 
have appeared few significant moves away from quite narrow 
themes or explanatory frameworks.
Some researchers have, however, attempted to evaluate
the political or other pressures which have had a significant
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impact on transport systems. Rimmer(44), for example, in 
exploring the nature of government influence on transport 
decision making in Thailand, found that numerous government 
departments and agencies were proposing and promoting 
several competing road and rail transportation schemes. He 
found, also, that the real power behind the decision to con­
struct transportation links lay not usually with the 
Government but with the Bangkok-located elitist groups and 
upper echelons in the bureaucracy. More recently, in a paper 
with Black (45) that has attempted to show the impact of con­
tainerisation on urban Sydney, he notes the problems which 
arise from conflicting interest groups and the nature of 
planner and Government intervention. There is no attempt, 
however, to examine the decision-making process in any detail
The incorporation of pluralism and group theory into 
explanations of locational decision-making has led to few 
geographic studies which have departed significantly, either 
in method or content, from earlier attempts to examine the 
location of transport infrastructure..
In the UK, K i r b y (46) has recognised the need to examine 
more carefully the bases of spatial conflicts and to 
identify a 'chain of events' (47). Although he notes the 
by-now classic example of transport infrastructural decision­
making, that related to the location of the third London 
airport, there is no geographic study available in a decision 
al framework.
Grant, however, in The Politics of Urban Transport 
Planning (48) does, in fact, explore the question of location
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and change in urban transport infrastructure and, despite 
Kirby's comment that it is anecdotal in character, provides 
a commendable insight into the decision-making processes 
involved.
Grant suggested that location decision-making was a 
product of the interaction of a number of self-interest 
groups, Government officials and individual participants who 
by way of bargaining and coercive processes resolved con­
flicts and in his study of transport infrastructure change, 
found that the "...conventional descriptions of urban trans­
port policy making appear(ed) to have little validity in the 
cases e xamined"(49). His study demonstrated that transport 
planning and policy making is a political process, both 
because decisions allocate resources to different social 
groups and because decisions are made in response to pressure 
exerted on the members of coalitions.
Grant's research and analysis of local transportation 
planning and policy making processes were based on case 
studies of Portsmouth, Southampton and Nottingham during the 
period from 1947 to 1974. His findings indicated that des­
pite the fact that the aims of the initial transport policies 
were similar in each city, the results of the case studies 
revealed that the three cities actually produced widely 
different transportation systems. These differences, Grant 
argued, were a result of, and reflected, the interests of the 
diverse and changing political and technical participants as 
well as lobby and vested interest groups.
Few other studies examine the mechanisms of decision­
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making in depth.
R o b s o n ' s (50) report on the 'battle of the Bodley 
barricades', for example, referred to a transport, or more 
particularly, traffic-rrelated problem and though the approach 
showed clearly the nature of social conflict and the impor­
tance of a 'hidden agenda' in conflict situations, the study 
related more to problems of social and residential space than 
to those related to transport infrastructure. More recently, 
W i l k i n s o n (51) has demonstrated the underlying power relation­
ships in conflict over transport plans for Melbourne, though 
he makes no attempt to emphasise the spatial dimensions of 
the problem. There has emerged, then, albeit somewhat tenta­
tively in the literature, a greater appreciation that in 
order to properly understand the locational patterns and 
structure of transport routes, nets and whole systems it is 
appropriate, even mandatory, to explore the intricacies of the 
decision-making process and the 'plays of power' which are so 
fundamental to it. In the next section, the study problem is 
outlined and some working hypotheses established.
B. THE RESEARCH PROBLEM AND SOME WORKING HYPOTHESES
During the late 1960s and the 1970s, the NSW coal indus­
try expanded considerably when production increased from 24.5 
million tonnes in 1965 to 40.2 million tonnes in 1975.
During this period coal exports rose from 5.6 million tonnes 
in 1965 to 14.5 million tonnes in 1975(52). The expansion of 
the export market had placed considerable strain on existing 
export facilities which, although having a theoretical maximum
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capacity of 17.5 million tonnes in the early 1970s, had an 
actual operating capacity of between 14 and 15 million tonnes 
per y e a r (53).
The pressure on existing facilities, together with a 
widespread optimism in the industry's continued growth, led 
to a number of proposals for port development and associated 
infrastructure changes. These included the proposal by Clutha 
Development Proprietary Limited (Clutha) for the construction 
of an offshore coal loader at Coalcliff which would handle all 
Burragorang Valley coal. When this project was abandoned, a 
number of alternative options were considered including the 
proposal by a consortium of coal companies with mining inter­
ests in the Western fields and the Burragorang Valley, for the 
construction of a new coal loader in Port Botany.
The proposals created considerable controversy and when 
these options were ultimately abandoned, primarily as a result 
of pressure from political and vested interest groups, the 
eventual location chosen for the new facility was Port Kembla. 
The provision of a port-related transport network was to 
create further controversy and a large range of options was 
canvassed. The choice between alternate modes, alternate 
routes and ancillary structures, such as coal bins, were, and 
to some extent remain, major problems. <
Early in the research exercise it became apparent that 
traditional and positivist explanations of infrastructure and 
facility locations, relying as they do largely on costs or 
relative advantage, were irrelevant. What did seem to be fun­
damental to an adequate explanation was the way in which 
vested interest groups, including trade unions and community
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pressure groups, the Government, political parties and indi­
vidual politicians were able to interact to obtain changes 
in proposals, or to influence both the content of a decision 
and the way in which it was implemented. Spatial patterns of 
location, of linkage, of orientation and of structure 
appeared to be the direct outcome of these 'political' 
processes.
The research design focussed, therefore, on an explora­
tion of the decision-making processes and mechanisms associ­
ated with the locational aspects of port-oriented transport 
infrastructure. The study falls within the general methodo­
logical framework of decisional analysis.
A number of working hypotheses were established to 
explore the relationships between the 'political' processes 
and locational patterns and structure.
(i) It is hypothesised that even when integrated 
and co-ordinated planning does occur, the 
implementation stage of the decision-making 
process is disjointed and unco-ordinated 
because of the incremental characteristics 
of the implementation process. Moreover, in­
crementalism reflects the inability or re­
luctance of the decision maker, in this case 
State Government, to provide resources 
sufficient for the completion of the policy 
plan as well as the participation in the 
decision-making process of powerful interest 
groups which may, in order to promote or
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protect their own vested interests,
prevent the implementation of the
policy plan. .
The hypothesis is examined in the context of the large 
range of development plans or proposals suggested as essen­
tial for the development of an efficient export handling 
system for coal from southern NSW.
(ii) It is hypothesised that although trade 
unions are effective and powerful elements 
in the decision-making process, trade union 
co-operation may expedite the implementa­
tion process though inter and intra union 
rivalry may intensify the problem of con­
flict and inhibit its resolution. Two 
separate, though related decisions - to 
establish a coal storage facility near 
Bellambi and to establish a new coal loader 
at the port of Port Kembla - are examined 
in some detail to test the hypothesis.
(iii) It is hypothesised that although the in­
fluence of interest groups varies, success 
is closely related to the extent and inten­
sity of political alliances and to the 
nature of the issues involved.
The hypothesis is tested by examining the structure, 
role and policies of four interest groups which have been 
important in the decision-making process related to the
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provision of coal transport infrastructure.
Data were drawn from many sources but the detailed, day- 
to-day files of the local newspaper, the Illawarra Mercury, 
over the period 1968 to 1984 provided a most comprehensive 
coverage of events as they happened. Where necessary, the 
files were supplemented by reference to other newspaper files, 
particularly The Sydney Morning Herald and The Financial 
R eview.
Over the period covered by the study there have been 
numerous official inquiries, commissions, environmental 
assessments and impact studies and many Council and Advisory 
Committee reports and these have also provided important 
source material. In addition, a number of interest groups as 
well as official committees have provided access to minutes 
of meetings and other documentary sources.
It was possible, also, to interview a number of people 
in the mining industry, trade unions, planning agencies and 
members of interest groups.
C. THE STRUCTURE OF THIS STUDY
After this introductory chapter, attention'is turned’ 
towards an examination of some fundamental aspects of the 
decision-making process. It attempts to clarify the nature 
of decisions and the elements within the decision-making 
process. It examines, briefly, the structure of the more 
recent decision-making models which have appeared in the 
literature and goes on to develop a framework which - ,
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underlines the dynamic structure of the decision-making 
p r o cess.
Chapter 3 provides a background for later, more 
detailed discussion and traces the development, or proposed 
development, of coal loading facilities to handle export 
coal from southern NSW. More particularly it examines the 
Clutha proposal for an offshore loader at Coalcliff, the 
proposed offshore loader at Port Kembla, the proposed Botany 
Bay loader and finally, the development of the new, inshore 
loader in the port of Port Kembla.
That subsequent decision-making and implementation of 
infrastructure proposals were complex and extended over a 
long period of time is discussed in Chapter 4. It demon*?1.. . 
strates that Lindblom's notion of 'disjointed incrementalism' 
in project implementation is well exemplified by Government 
action and inaction over the period.
Chapters 5 and 6 examine the ways in which trade unions 
and interest group pressures are effective means of expedi­
ting implementation of projects, or of modifying projects or, 
indeed, of causing them to be abandoned.
Chapter 7 notes some of the more important implications 
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CHAPTER 2: DECISIONAL ANALYSIS AND THE LOCATION OF TRANSPORT 
INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONCEPTUAL FRAME
The Decision-Making Process: Some Fundamental Considerations
Decision-making resulting in the provision and location 
of transport infrastructure is a product of a complex politi­
cal process. It is political not merely because the state 
and politicians are major participants but because it incor­
porates activities of people in various groups as they struggle 
for and use power to achieve personal and group purposes(1).
The elements in the process include Governments, 
politicians, political factions, concerned citizens, voters 
and trade unions - in fact, any group of people with a common 
aim and who have combined their resources in order to influ­
ence a decision for a proposed facility. The groups and type 
of participant may vary with different proposals and their 
significance and ability to influence will also differ though 
all participants have a vested interest to promote or protect 
and all possess the power to potentially influence other par­
ticipants and policy.
Power is distributed unequally among the elements and for 
the purpose of this study is defined as the ability to influ­
ence the decision-making behaviour of one or more of the
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elements. The type of influence exerted by involved groups 
and their actual role and function varies as does the extent 
of the influence. This may include for example the ability 
to initiate development and the authority to approve or veto 
a proposal. The power of lobby groups may include the abil­
ity to exert pressure so that decisions are not implemented 
as planned but are modified, or in some instances abandoned 
altogether; the ability of trade union groups to prevent con­
struction of a facility or project; and the potential influ­
ence and lobbying power of the voter and the politician's 
reaction to pressure. -
There appears to be some general confusion about the 
nature of a 'decision' and it is worth considering its defin­
ition carefully. If it is defined as an initial agreement 
and permission to proceed, then development agencies, as 
initiators and the state as the consenting authority, are the 
major decision makers. However, this definition is simplis­
tic and 'a decision' cannot be defined as merely a plan and 
permission to proceed since there must exist the technologi­
cal, economic and environmental feasibility and potential for 
implementation and resolution. A decision made in order to 
rectify a problem without the potential of resolution and 
implementation is meaningless. A condition only becomes a 
problem and a meaningful decision to resolve it made when the 
feasibility of its resolution and implementation exists. 
Lindblom(2) points out, for example, that landing a man on 
the moon only became a problem when it became technologically 
feasible to resolve it. A decision is, therefore, only one 
part of a process; and that process begins with an initial
29
proposal and decision and concludes with its implementation, 
modification or abandonment. Moreover, since the implemen­
tation of a decision may depend largely upon the co-operation 
of pressure and lobby groups, these necessarily form inher­
ent parts of the decision-making process.
Decision-making is conflict resolution. Conflict may 
emerge at any stage of the process. It may occur initially 
in trying to identify a problem or establishing whether or 
not a problem actually exists; or while determining a possible 
solution or during its implementation. As all elements in the 
decision-making process are biased (since all have a vested 
interest to protect or promote), this bias will determine the 
choice of action to attain a resolution most consistent with 
the ideal and goals of the group or faction represented. As 
conflicting aims and aspirations may be held by participants 
and as all goals of all participants may not be fulfilled 
equally, a compromise must be reached before a resolution can 
be obtained.
Attempts to resolve the conflict may initially be through 
mutual persuasion and bargaining. However, if that course of 
action fails, then the influence and exercise of power may 
include action of one sort or another - sanctions, threats, 
bans, for example. It is a bargaining process where partici­
pants may make a number of concessions in order to obtain 
some desired conditions in return.
The decision-making process is divisible into two separ­
ate though interrelated phases. The initial stage begins with
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the recognition of the existence of a problem. When the 
problem becomes apparent, or perhaps acute, appropriate 
planning is carried out or action taken in order to resolve 
it. This initial stage may include proposals on how the 
problem may be resolved and where the project will be 
located.
The initial or planning stage includes formal procedures 
such as a public announcement of the proposal and the comple­
tion of such formalities as required by Government, including 
in NSW, for example, the preparation of Environmental Impact 
Statements (EIS), subsequent assessments and inquiries and 
calls for public response to the proposal.
It is generally during the second stage, after the propo­
sal has been made public and attempts at implementation begin, 
that interest groups assume importance. This stage may become 
highly politicised and a major source of conflict. This may 
concern the problem of the proposed location of a facility, 
for example, though in policy conflicts, the conflict may 
arise not only in respect of location, but in respect of the 
whole issue - as, for example, in the debate about nuclear 
p o w e r .
Although trade union power may be seen as the prime 
example of group power in the Australian context, the diffi­
culties of implementation of projects are by no means confined 
to this type of pressure group. Other groups have begun to 
impinge upon the policy process with increasing effect.
The voter has also become increasingly influential, parti­
cularly in marginal electorates. Furthermore, group pressure
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is not necessarily a negative force, preventing implementa­
tion or necessitating modification of plans or abandonment 
of the project. In fact, just the opposite may be the case 
as group co-operation may greatly improve the implementation 
process. This is especially apparent in development projects 
which have the support and co-operation of relevant trade 
union groups.
It is, then, in the implementation stage that the process 
may become disjointed and unco-ordinated since all relevant 
aspects of a policy strategy may not be developed simultan­
eously and sections of any part of a plan may be developed 
in response to a crisis, independent of related requirements. 
Lindblom(3) argues that policy implementation proceeds through 
a process of 'disjointed incrementalism' - a series of incre­
mental moves on a particular problem - rather than through a 
comprehensive reform programme. Moreover, the incremental 
character of the process may appear to resemble ad hoc 
decision-making. This is not the case however, because the 
process is, in fact, carried out as a planned incremental 
progression where stages of the decisions are implemented in 
response to crises as they occur.
This does not mean that the disjointed character of the 
process emerges solely as a result of lobby group participa­
tion. In numerous instances Governments themselves may be 
responsible for the disjointed mode of implementation because 
they proceed to develop in a series of incremental steps and 
do not allocate resources for the development of the entire 
policy plan. There may be legitimate reasons for this
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including, for example, uncertainty of future requirements 
and the reluctance or inability to allocate sufficient funds 
to enable all related developments to be carried out simul­
taneously. Even in a stable economic climate, projected re­
quirements for periods exceeding a number of decades become 
uncertain and, as a result, a reluctance exists to implement 
plans to satisfy possible distant future demands. Thus the 
aim of implementation becomes the satisfaction of immediate 
requirements.
A further reason appears to be the inability or reluc­
tance of Governments to allocate large capital outlays in order 
to implement simultaneously all related aspects of a policy 
plan. This may be particularly relevant in the case where 
Governments finance transport infrastructure developments where 
the benefits of the expenditure may be experienced by a rela­
tively small population. It would appear that if only a . ' 
relatively small number of people (voters) benefit or observe 
the effects of the financial outlay, then a Government may 
consider it politically expedient to spread the funds over a 
number of projects. As a result, incremental steps are made 
in a number of projects and no single project is completed 
according to the policy plan.
Models of Decision-making in the Geographical Literature
If, then, decision-making is fundamentally and inherently 
a political process and spatial patterns and structure may 
reflect and be conditioned by the complexity and characteris­
tics of this process, one of the important research problems
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is to define a conceptual or methodological framework within 
which the particular empirical problem can be examined. To 
some extent there remains a good deal to be done in this 
respect within the discipline though some important contribu­
tions have been made. The following paragraphs note these.
C o x ( 4 ) f for example, in pursuing the theme 'conflict and 
politics' approaches the processes of decision-making some­
what obliquely, focussing on conflict per s e , as a phenomenon 
to be explained rather than as a not unusual, indeed integral, 
part of the much broader process of decision-making. He 
argues that conflict studies may be interpreted 'against the 
backdrop of locational analysis' and rightly points out that 
the rigidly deterministic frame of classical location theory 
is simply quite inadequate to explain locational patterns.
He further suggests that four 'themes' are important in formu­
lating "...an embryonic framework of ideas for understanding 
the role of conflict in creating the urban environment - 
externalities, rent, institutions ana interest groups"; and 
that deviations from the theoretical patterns "...have to be 
explained in terms of conflicts consequent upon exceptions to 
the assumptions (perfect competition, perfect mobility etc.) 
underlying the basic explanatory framework"(5).
Alternately, however, Cox suggests that it may be better 
to abandon the restrictive framework of locational analysis 
and see "...particular conflicts ...(as) time- and 
place-specific manifestations of deeper conflicts within market 
societies" (6) . He therefore argues for a broader, Marxist 
view of conflict, which sees social relationships within a
34
broader pattern of class relationships and struggle. There 
remains, however, the need for considerable clarification of 
both of these positions. Certainly the emphasis on conflict, 
per s e , and on externalities, for example, detracts from an 
understanding of the overall decision-making process.
A somewhat different perspective of the relationships 
between political processes and space has emerged, drawing 
its inspiration from political science and emerging largely 
through political geography. This approach orients itself to 
the decision-making process, though its focus is not on de­
fining political power linkages and power plays per se but 
rather on the outworking of these relationships in space.
Recently, L o g a n (7) and Muir and Paddison(8) have offered 
explanatory frameworks which adopt this approach and their 
work is worthy of closer examination.
Logan argues for a 'power-based' approach to the analysis 
of politico-spatial problems and suggests that "Political 
controls, conflicts and decision-making exist in countless 
forms and are associated not only with formal Governmental and 
political institutions but also with political parties, trade 
unions, professional associations, resident action groups and 
a multitude of informal interpersonal and intergroup transac­
tions. At the micro-level, political geography will be most 
concerned with power - in the sense of the individual's or 
local group's ability to make decisions which effectively 
determine the kind of environment they are to live in, and 
their ability to command a 'fair share' of public resources;
and with conflicts - which where different aspirations are in
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opposition, where constraints or controls are imposed by 
other individuals, groups or governments, or where suffering 
results from unfair resource allocations"(9). .
Logan's model, based on the concepts of power and con­
flict, is useful and "...attempts to emphasise the fact that 
decision makers and the planners responsible for the implemen­
tation of policy perceive issues differently, and that their 
perception of the problem environment is influenced by their 
own consciously- or unconsciously-felt interests, which, in 
turn, reflect their own position in society and the pressure 
brought to bear on their thinking by other power holders in 
society. The perception filter and the external pressures to 
which decision makers are subjected are the critical link in 
the causal chain between the initial problem and the attempted 
s o lution"(10).
The model underlines the importance of a proper recogni­
tion of subjective and perceptual factors in the process; it 
stresses the significance of the pattern of power relation­
ships which exist within the decision-making context; and, 
importantly, it separates the whole decision-making process 
into its two phases - the policy formation and decision phase 
and the implementation or action phase.
Muir and Paddison see "political geographical investiga­
tion (as) likely to focus upon specific real world processes 
and the testing and subsequent modification and development of 
spatially oriented models of the decision p r o c e s s " (11). Their 
approach is characterised by its total emphasis on the 
decision process as a dynamic interactive set of tensions
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between different elements within the process, with a series 
of events and outcomes. Importantly, the process occurs 
within a given spatial context. It tends to be an integra­
tive approach, building on earlier work on the nature of 
decision-making and of power structures and relationships.
It is worth noting in more detail.
The decision-making process, the authors argue, is rather 
more complex than a simplistic rational or normative model 
would suggest. In this model the decision maker converts 
perfect information into rational decisions and the process 
follows a number of steps. These include, for example, the 
specification of definition of goals by the decision -maker, 
the identification of possible actions, the evaluation of the 
likely effects of the implementation of the various alterna­
tives and the estimation of the likelihood or probability of 
particular effects occurring. The decision maker is then 
able to rank the various alternatives and choose the most 
desirable.
Reality is not, however, so simple and decisions reached 
will be satisficing rather than optimising, or 'rational1 in 
the strictest sense. But, as Muir and Paddison point out, 
"...the only rational decision is one which can be accepted 
by the influential actors whose support for a decision or 
policy is crucial. Thus a decision which embodies a satisfic­
ing compromise may be the only decision which is acceptable to 
the different interests participating in decision-making, and 
is therefore the rational d e c i s i o n " (12).
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In an attempt to provide a more adequate decision­
making model the authors suggest that, given a context in 
which it is possible to identify a number of particular.in­
terest groups or individuals (actors) with differing objec­
tives then a conflict situation can be analysed by examining 
four concept areas - goals, action schema, power relationships 
and o u t c o m e s (13). Clearly, goals of different groups will 
differ as each seeks to maximise utility and avoid incurring 
negative externalities. Action schema - "an active and 
self-consistent organisation of old and new information"(14) 
for each decision maker will vary and vary through time as 
conditions change. Action begets reaction and the moves by 
one actor will require adjustments to the position of other 
actors. Power relationships between actors will condition re­
actions, with differing abilities to initiate, veto or 
influence.
Muir and Paddison suggest also, following L e v i n (15), 
that the decision-making process is one which involves pro­
gression towards a situation in which decision makers "become 
increasingly specific in the identification of a desired 
outcome, and increasingly committed to a specific course of 
action" - in fact, to a "state of 100 percent specificity and 
100 percent commitment". '
Operationally, the authors suggest a five-step approach 
to research problems in decision-making. The first involves 
identifying the principal decision makers and developing an 
information base; the second step requires investigation of 
goals, goal structures and perceptions, for example, of the
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various actors; third, an analysis of power relationships and 
linkages is necessary; there follows an analysis of the 
"dynamic processes of interplay between the actors and their 
strategies and the resultant revisions of goal structures and 
action schema, culminating in the ultimate decision"; and 
finally, it is necessary to investigate the spatial effects of 
implementation.
This framework for analysis is particularly useful. It 
recognises the real-world complexity of the decision-making 
process and the necessity of exploring spatial change as a 
direct outcome of this complexity. It underlines the dynamics 
of decision-making processes, with the need for constant 
adjustment of strategies and changes in the status quo of the 
decision-making elements.
In the next section the details of a framework for the 
analysis of the locational decision-making processes within 
the specific context of this-study are set out.
A Framework for the Analysis of Transport Infrastructure 
Locational Decisions
Infrastructure decisions related to the movement of 
export coal through Port Kembla have been, and are, character­
ised by intricate and complex interactions, or 'power plays', 
among a number of vested interest groups.
Figure 2.1 is an attempt to indicate, in general terms, 
the elements in the 'power play' and the pattern of power 
linkages which have existed, and continue to exist, within the 
decision-making process that has characterised coal transport
39
infrastructure decisions in southern NSW. It follows D a h l (16) 
in suggesting that decision-making involves the processes of 
initiation, modification and veto but, with Muir and Paddison, 
recognises that "...different kinds of power ...are reflected 
in abilities to initiate, veto and influence"(17). No 
attempt is made to show the strength of power relationships 
since this is likely to vary, quite markedly, through time.
The political elements within the process are diverse and 
often conflicting and include the Government in power (Federal, 
State and Local); opposition parties; and individual politi­
cians who may deviate from party policy in order to promote 
the interests of their electorates, (Figure 2.1).
The Government in office has the unique role of being the 
authorising body, having the power to approve or veto develop­
ment; it may also be the initiator of the project as well as 
the funding body. Despite this it is not an autonomous entity 
and cannot act independently of other participants, nor is it 
immune from the influences and pressures exerted by other 
participants. If pressure is exerted upon it by lobby groups 
sufficiently powerful to influence policy or implementation, 
a compromise may be reached and the decision may be amended 
accordingly.
Opposition parties are neither initiators nor consenting 
bodies and may act, in effect, as a pressure group. In the 
event that development proposals create conflict and become 
controversial issues, members of opposition parties may iden­
tify with concerned residents in affected areas and lobby 




figure 2.1: Power relationships among elements in the coal
transport infrastructure decision-making process.
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genuine belief may be held concerning the possible adverse 
repercussions if the project proceeds. The alliance with 
lobby groups in opposing controversial proposals may, however, 
be little more than a disguise for covert political and per­
sonal motives. It may prove politically expedient and an 
opportunity for gaining advantage over political opponents, 
particularly in marginal electorates. In the event of a pro­
posal creating conflict and controversy, as occurred with the 
proposed Port Botany coal loader or Clutha's proposal for an 
offshore loader at Coalcliff, an issue may become part of a 
political platform particularly, of course, if an election is 
imminent.
Individual politicians are subject to a wide range of 
pressures (18) from a variety of sources, including the poli­
tical party with which they are affiliated, constituents and 
lobby groups. Where a Government proposal may prove to be un­
popular and possibly detrimental to a particular electorate, 
politicians may, however, oppose party policy in order to 
protect and promote the vested interests of the electorate; 
and in those instances, the interests of the electorate have 
precedence over those of the party. Although voters do not 
directly determine what policy will be developed, their 
choices in elections do, of course, have an indirect influence 
on the decisions of leaders since results at elections may be 
interpreted as indicating a preference for, or acquiescence 
in certain lines of policy(19).
Trade unions are neither initiators nor developers, /. 
though they may be extremely influential, particularly when
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implementation of the decision is attempted.
Political scientists have tended to neglect the study 
of policy implementation(20) or else, like Lindblom(21), do 
not distinguish between policy making and the actual imple­
mentation process. However, despite detailed planning and 
policy formulation, it seems likely that initiators of 
policy, and, particularly Governments, are becoming increas­
ingly aware that the real test of power is whether or not 
their policies are implemented(22).
Implementation may depend upon the co-operation of 
participating g r o u p s (23) and in this context trade union 
participation, and to an increasing extent, trade union 
sanction and approval may be crucial.
The reasons for trade union participation are diverse 
and may include economic, social and ideological considera­
tions. Furthermore, these may vary according to the economic 
context. During a period of economic recession and high un­
employment, for example, union concern may be for economic 
issues such as employment and to a lesser extent for environ­
mental and ideological metters. Trade unions exert influence 
on decision makers in various ways but industrial action and 
the imposition of bans may have widespread consequences 
resulting in modification of plans or even the abandonment of 
the project.
Union participation in the decision-making process may 
vary considerably; however, conflict may occur not only 
between different unions but also within a particular union -
43
inter union conflict in transport infrastructure development 
is likely to occur, for example, if the Government is seen 
to be promoting rail rather than road transport. Intra 
union conflict is likely to occur if union members in a 
particular location appear to be disadvantaged relative to 
other members. In the case of Clutha's proposal for an off­
shore loader, for example, the Miners Federation favoured the 
state ownership of coal loading facilities and opposed 
Clutha's proposal. However, Burragorang Valley miners, who 
believed that their continued prosperity depended upon the 
completion of the project, supported it(24).
Interest groups tend to exert pressure indirectly - often 
as a result of an alliance with a political party, a union or 
influential members of the community. They emerge primarily 
from affected communities(25) where concerned residents com­
bine resources to strengthen their influence. The success of 
community groups will often depend on the availability of 
resources(26), their power and organising ability and upon the 
support they evoke.
Clearly, the pattern of power linkages is complex and 
power relationships condition every phase of transport infra­
structure decision-making. However, it is important to see 
the pattern in process terms and as part of a dynamic, chang­
ing set of conditions. Figure 2.2 illustrates, in dia­
grammatic form, the sequential staging of 'actions' and 
'activities' in the process and effectively 'operationalises' 
the decision-making process.
The decision-making process, as suggested earlier,
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Figure 2.2: The coal transport infrastructure decision-making process.
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comprises two separate though interrelated stages. First, 
the Planning Stage, which begins with the recognition of a 
problem arising from conditions which necessitate a solution 
of one sort or another. This stage concludes when approval 
for the solution - in this context, an infrastructural 
project - has been given by the appropriate authority and a 
firm locational decision made. Second, the Implementation 
Stage comprises those actions and activities which are taken 
to set the project in place. It is in this stage that the 
'power plays' among the elements in the process are likely to 
become overt, intensive and compelling, resulting in implemen­
tation of the project, its modification or indeed its 
abandonment.
The process is seen to be initiated (Initial Conditions) 
by a particular set of market circumstances and the structure 
and operations of the coal industry in the southern and 
western, districts of NSW, with transport linkages for export 
coal to Port Kembla or Balmain. Rising production and. 
foreign demand for increased volumes of export coal created 
diseconomies in the transport of coal. Moreover, it was per­
ceived that operations would become increasingly inefficient.
These conditions prompted action by a number of coal 
companies, in discussion with State Government and its 
appropriate Departments and agencies (Project Initiators).
In due course a Proposal, until this point in time discussed 
largely if not exclusively by the Project Initiators, is made 
known to the public. The subsequent actions may be almost 
immediate, or may in fact take place over a relatively long
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period of time. These can be regarded as either Formal or 
Informal in nature. Since 1972, for example, an 
Environmental Impact Statement has been required by the State 
Government for major projects and project proposals must be 
publicly exhibited. The appointment of a Commissioner is 
made, also, to inquire into the feasibility of the proposal. 
Interested persons or groups are invited to make contribu­
tions to the Inquiry. An Environmental Impact Assessment is 
also required and is submitted to the Inquiry. (Prior to 
1979, Environmental Impact Assessments for infrastructure 
developments were prepared by the State Pollution Control 
Commission but have, since that time, been prepared by the 
Department of Environment and Planning. Where proposals are 
controversial it is likely that 'battle lines' begin to be 
drawn up and alliances are formed and 'action' groups in one 
form or another appear.
As a result of Inquiry proceedings, a formal recommenda­
tion is made to Government for the implementation or other­
wise of the project and a formal decision (Project Decision) 
is subsequently made. This decision is, in effect, the final 
action of the 'planning process' and, if positive, implemen­
tation of the policy plan may begin.
It is from this point forward that the full effects of 
the intricate power linkages ('Power Play'), as described in 
Figure 2.1, become evident. (This is not to say that there 
may not already be considerable evidence of power plays but 
that the Implementation step will certainly intensify these 
pressures and tensions). The 'Power Play' element in
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Figure 2.2, therefore, is effectively described by Figure 2.1.
The outcome of this often complex 'play' will be either 
acceptance of the project proposal, or its abandonment. If, 
in fact, the project implementation is able to proceed then 
project completion may result in a whole range of spatial 
changes - a set of new physical elements (coal bins, coal 
loaders, roads and rail links), new patterns of orientation, 
changed patterns of land use responses, both positive and 
negative environmental externalities and new patterns of 
accessibility.
The diagram is enticingly simple; but the decision-making 
process is not. Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 reveal the complexity 
of the process though discussion follows the conceptual per­
spective outlined in this section.
48
References and Notes
1. International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (1968), 
Vol.12, pl265.
2. Lindblom, C.E. (1968), The Policy Making Process, 
Prentice Hall, New Jersey, p.14.
3. Braybrooke, D. and Lindblom, C.E. (1963),
A Strategy of Decisions, Free Press, New York,
p. 81.
4. Cox, K.R. and Johnston, R.J. (1982), "Conflict Politics
and the Urban Scene; A Conceptual Framework",
Cox, K.R. and Johnston, R.J. (1982), Conflict, 
Politics and the Urban Scene, Longman, London.
5. Ibi d ., p . 3.
6. Ibi d ., p.17.
7. Logan, W.S. (1978), Post-convergence Political Geography -
Death or Transfiguration?
Monash Publications in Geography, N o.18,
Monash University, Melbourne.
8. Muir, R. and Paddison,-R. (1981), Politics, Geography 
and Behaviour, Methuen, London.









1 Muir , R. and Paddison, R. (1981), op.cit., p.62.
12. I b i d ., p . 64 .
13. I b i d ., pp. 6 6-69.
•1—1 I b i d ., p . 6 7 .
15. L e v i n , P.H. (1972), "On Decisions and Decision-Making" ,
Public „Administration, p.27.
49
16. Dahl, R.A. (1961), Who Governs? Yale University Press,
New Haven.
17. Muir, R. and Paddison, R. (1981), op.cit., pp. 68-6.9.
18. Grant, J. (1977), The Politics of Urban Transport
Planning, Earth Resources Research Limited,
London, p.37.
19. Dahl, R.A. (1961), op.cit., p.163.
20. Richardson, J.J. and Jordan, A.C. (1974), Governing
Under Pressure, Martin and Robertson, Oxford, 
p.137.
21. Lindblom, C.E. (1968), op.cit.
22. Richardson, J.J. and Jordan, A.C. (1974), op.cit., p.137.
23. I b i d ., p .140.
24. Illawarra M e r c u r y , 8th.July, 1971, p.3.
25. Grant, J. (1977), op.cit., p.35.
26. I b i d ., p .36.
50
CHAPTER 3: COAL TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE: THE CONTEXT 
OF DEVELOPMENT
During the 1960s the NSW coal industry underwent major 
changes as coal production and export levels increased con­
siderably (Tables 3.1, 3.2). As a consequence of this rapid 
expansion, and in order to cater for future developments, there 
were major initiatives to plan and construct new coal loading 
facilities and to establish other major transport-related in­
frastructure required for the export of coal.
The decision to establish these new facilities was made in 
response to economic and market demands. However, the imple­
mentation of the decisions and the ultimate location of new 
infrastructure were determined neither by economic nor morpho­
logical considerations but were, in fact, the outcome of 
complex political processes in which the influences and pressure 
from powerful vested interest groups played a significant role 
in determining not only whether or not the projects would be 
developed but also where they would be located. '
This chapter discusses the somewhat tangled web of events 
which was associated with the long process of establishing port 
handling facilities for southern export coal, culminating in the 
construction of the Port Kembla coal loader. It outlines the 
context of the development of port-oriented coal transport
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TABLE 3.1: COAL PRODUCTION IN NSW, 1963-1982 *
(million tonnes)
Year








1963 19.24 1.66 2.05 5.88
1964 21.03 1.61 2.10 6.4 2
1965 24.51 1.71 2.94 6.88
1966 25.87 1.60 3.46 6.78
1967 27.24 1.56 3.50 7.45
1968 30.83 1.89 3.87 7.81
1969 33.97 1.80 4.34 9.00
1970 35.89 2.26 4.98 8.37
1971 34.56 2.23 5.01 7.93
1972 39.17 2.30 4.64 9.88
1973 37.88 1.92 4.14 9.88
1974 38.69 2.32 3.79 8.59
1975 40.21 2.91 5.11 8.47
1976 44.74 4.06 5.19 9.88
1977 47.88 3.99 5.11 11.21
1978 50.67 4.28 5.19 11.16
1979 50.88 4.55 5.95 11.53
1980 50.71 5.07 4.61 10.44
1981 60.74 7.50 4.94 13.48
1982 64.87 8.80 3.55 12.94
* Source: Joint Coal Board (1983), Black Coal in Australia
1982-83, Sydney, adapted from Table 18, p.21.
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TABLE 3.2: COAL EXPORTS FROM NSW, 1963-1982 *
(million tonnes)
Year Tsjcur —
Exports from NSW Por ts
Total Exports Sydney** Port Kembla Newcastle
1963 2.76 1.17 1.02 0.57
1964 3.71 1.36 1.45 0.89
1965 5.58 1.81 1.58 2.18
1966 6.91 2.24 1.80 2.85
1967 7.58 2.31 1.73 3.53
1968 9.14 2.65 1.68 4.80
1969 11.14 2.75 2.50 5.88
1970 11.94 2.36 3.19 6.38
1971 12.91 2.91 2.48 7.50
1972 11.63 2.24 3.48 5.90
1973 12.00 2.08 3.61 6.30
1974 13.71 2.10 3.01 8.60
1975 14.49 2.75 3.70 8.03
1976 14.93 2.40 4.73 7.79
1977 17.17 2.54 5.8 9 8.74
1978 19.66 2.97 6.19 10.49
1979 19.67 3.04 6.30 10.32
1980 22.90 3.51 6.09 13.29
1981 23.26 2.70 6.65 13.90
1982 24.99 4.60 6.23 14.15
* Source: Joint Coal Board (1983), Black Coal in Australia
1982-83, Sydney, 
Table 96, p.86.
adapted from Table 92 , p.81 and
** Includes Balmain and Balls H e a d .
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infrastructure and is essentially a background chapter for the 
more detailed discussion of particular aspects of the location­
al decision-making processes associated with the provision of 
infrastructure. More particularly, the chapter begins with a 
discussion of the Clutha proposal for the development of off­
shore loading facilities in the northern Illawarra, a proposal 
which effectively polarised and politicised debate over the 
provision of coal loading facilities. The abandonment of the 
proposed facility led to renewed attempts to establish export 
facilities. The first alternate proposal was for an offshore 
loader at Port Kembla; the second was for new facilities to be 
built in Botany Bay; and the third, the development of a new 
loader in Port Kembla - finally commissioned in November 1982.
The Clutha Proposal for an Offshore Loader at Coalcliff
Black coal production in NSW almost doubled between 1960 
and 1970 when total production increased from 18 million tonnes 
in 1960 to 34 million tonnes in 1969. During this period the 
Burragorang Valley became an increasingly important coal mining 
region and production increased from 1.5 million tonnes in 1960 
to 4.3 million tonnes in 1969(1). Furthermore, Clutha, which 
owned all mines in the Burragorang Valley by 1968, speculated 
that production increases would continue and the company 
expected to produce as much as 10 million tonnes per y e a r (2).
In 1970 the Burragorang Valley mines produced 4.9 million 
tonnes of washed c o a l (3) of which 2.6 million tonnes were 
exported to Japan, Noumea and Europe. The balance was sold to 
local consumers. About two thirds of the coal was exported
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through the Balmain loader and the balance was dispatched by 
truck to the Port Kembla coal l o a d e r (4).
Loading facilities at NSW ports had an estimated capacity 
of approximately 17.5 million tonnes in 1974-75 though actual 
throughput was 14.5 million tonnes (Table 3.3). In fact, the 
theoretical rated throughputs were just that and the estima­
ted 6 million tonnes annual capacity for Port Kembla was quite 
impossible to achieve. Further upgrading was necessary if this 
target was to be r e a c h e d (5).
Coal exports from NSW in 1969 totalled 11.1 million 
tonnes (6) and if the projected increases for Clutha's mines 
eventuated it was apparent that existing coal facilities at 
NSW ports would be incapable of handling the increased 
quantities. The Burragorang Valley mines were not linked 
directly to rail facilities and the export coal was transported 
by a combination of truck and train a distance of 9 2 kms to the 
Balmain coal loader or by truck 72 kms to the Port Kembla 
loader. In order to replace the complicated road and rail 
system used, and in order to permit an expansion of production 
and maintain coal prices at a competitive level in interna­
tional markets, Clutha proposed the construction of a coal 
loading terminal at Coalcliff. Approval, in principle, was 
given by the State Liberal Government in October, 1969.
The project involved the construction of a railway from 
the Burragorang Valley to the Illawarra escarpment and a new 
offshore terminal at Coalcliff. A 64 km privately operated 
railway was to be built from Oakdale to a stockpile plant at 
Maddens Plains. An enclosed conveyor system would transport
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Newcastle 2.00 8.5 8.03 58 365 11.6
Sydney 1.00 3 2.65 44 260 11.6
Port Kembla 2.00 6 3.86 55 215 11.6
Queensland
Gladstone- 
Barney Point 2.00 8 3.23 75 206 12.2
Auckland
Point 1.60 5 3.66 63 183 11.2
Hay Point 4.00 12 10.84 120 213 16.8
Depth
Total Maximum Length at Low 
CoaL Size of Water
Loaded Vessel Berth Alongside 
1974 DWT Berth
* Source: Department of Public Works (1976), Offshore Coal 
Loader and Stockpiling Extensions Port Kembla,
NSW, Environmental Impact Statement, Sydney, p.42.
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the coal from the stockpile plant down the escarpment and out 
along the trestle pier to a shiploader on the terminal. The 
terminal was to be constructed about 1,220 metres offshore 
Coalcliff and would be designed to handle modern bulk carriers 
of between 50,000 and 250,000 DWT(7).
The stockpiles would cover an area of 8 hectares and have 
a capacity of 610,000 tonnes. They would be uncovered and a 
dust suppression system would be built into all facilities in 
order to minimise dust pollution. The train unloading point 
would be fully enclosed and fitted with dust suppression equip­
ment to ensure that small quantities of dust did not e s c a p e (8).
The terminal, the cost of which was expected to exceed 
$150 million, would be under the control of the Maritime 
Services Board, although it was to be financed and operated by 
Clutha(9). The design, construction and maintenance of the 
facilities were subject to the provisions of an agreement with 
the State Government and the building of the railway and loader 
required the sanction of a special Act of Parliament(10). The 
Clutha Bill was introduced in the NSW Legislative Assembly on 
18th November, 1970 and the Clutha Development Proprietary 
Limited Agreement Act was passed on 9th December, 1970.
There appears to exist little doubt that there was a need 
for the improvement of coal loading facilities, particularly 
if Clutha's projected production increase was to eventuate. 
Furthermore, if the company was to compete favourably on a 
world market, a more efficient and less costly method of trans­
porting the coal to the export ports was required. Under the 
existing circumstances, for example, washed coal exported
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through Balmain was trucked a distance of up to 32.<kms from one 
washery to a rail loading point at Campbelltown or collected 
by train at a second washery at Glenlee, near Camden. From 
there it was railed a distance of 92ikms to the Balmain loader.
The balance of the export coal was dispatched by truck a 
distance of 72 kms to Wollongong for shipment through the Port 
Kembla coal loader. This meant that more than 700 truck loads 
a w e e k (11) travelled from the Burragorang Valley through 
Wollongong's residential and commercial areas to Port Kembla. 
Furthermore, if Clutha's production increase eventuated, and 
in the event that the decision to construct the new loader at 
Coalcliff was not implemented, the number of trucks to Port 
Kembla would increase considerably since Balmain was already 
working at near capacity levels-in 1969, for example, the 
throughput at Balmain was 2.7 million tonnes^l2).
Despite the fact that the proposal appears to have been 
an economically viable proposition and a means of considerably 
reducing the number of coal trucks, which were creating a 
major problem in the Wollongong city and surrounding areas, its 
implementation did not eventuate and in February 1972 the State 
Government announced that the company would not proceed with 
the Coalcliff loader.
The company suggested that the reason for the abandonment 
of the project was the collapse of the Japanese m a r k e t (13).
But there is little doubt that, in fact, the decision was 
prompted not so much by economic factors as by the damaging, 
lengthy and powerful opposition campaign waged against the pro­
posal (and the Company) by lobby groups, including politicians
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(particularly ALP politicians), environmentalists and a number 
of trade unions.
The Clutha proposal created considerable controversy and 
numerous public meetings were held on the South Coast and the 
Southern highlands, as well as in Sydney. The issue became 
the subject of questions, motions of urgency and adjournment 
debates in the State and Federal parliaments; a dozen trade 
unions declared their opposition to the project and a decision 
of the NSW Labour Council gave them encouragement; four politi­
cal parties made policy pronouncements on the Clutha Act and 
three made its repeal part of their platform. Non-party action 
groups were formed, specifically to defeat the company's plans, 
and the controversy occupied prime space in newspapers and pro­
vided material for television and radio comm e n t a r y (14).
The anti-Clutha campaign appears to have been initiated by 
the Australian Labor Party, whose members worked throughout 
the campaign to hhve the Act repealed and the project 
abandoned. In S e ptember, 1970 Les Johnson, the Member of the 
House of Representatives,for Hughes, the federal electorate in 
which the company proposed to locate its project, called on the 
Federal Government to investigate the effects of the proposed 
l o a d e r (15). The Hughes Federal Electorate Council subsequently 
resolved to establish an organisation to inquire into and 
publicise the company's activities. This organisation became 
known as the South Coast Organisation Opposing Pollution - 
SCOOP - and its association with the ALP provided it with 
finance, an organisational structure within the area and a 
of contacting ALP branch m e m b e r s (15).means
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The majority of the initial members of SCOOP were resi­
dents of the northern suburbs of Wollongong and the subsequent 
campaign was motivated, ostensibly, by environmental concerns 
of residents; but the ALP involvement became the means of 
gaining political advantage over its opponent and of embarrass­
ing the State Liberal Government. The first pamphlets and 
press releases emphasized that the effects on the environment 
of large stockpiles and the construction of a loader were com­
pletely unknown and concern was expressed for the protection 
of the local coastline and its b e a c h e s (17). SCOOP claimed that 
the coal stock piles and the loader were potential polluters of 
air and sea and that they, and the railway serving them, would 
possibly endanger Sydney's water supply(18).
Opposition to the company's plans came also from well co­
ordinated attacks from the South Coast Conservation S o c i e t y (19), 
the Social Responsibility in Science and Ecology Action 
g r o u p s (20). The anti-Clutha campaign gained active support 
from a number of trade unions. The three railway unions - the 
Australian Federated Union of Locomotive Enginemen, the :: 
Australian Railways Union and the Australasian Transport 
Officers Association - believed that the Construction of a pri­
vate railway system could possibly threaten the employment 
opportunities of their members. *
The Transport Workers' Union held a similar interest in 
the issue as the Clutha company, since 1970, had moved increas­
ing volumes of the Burragorang Valley coal to the Port Kembla 
coal loader by truck and the construction of a railway line to 
the proposed coal loader would result in the loss of jobs for
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truck drivers. Unsuccessful attempts had been made by Clutha 
to placate the Transport Workers Union by suggesting that 
some of its members might be found jobs in the company's 
w a s h e r y (21).
The Miners' Federation was divided over the issue because, 
while recognizing that NSW required new loading facilities and 
although the Federation declared that, in principle, it was in 
favour of State ownership of coal loading facilities and that 
the new loader should be built and operated by the Government, 
it did not condemn the company's plans. Furthermore, since 
1965 Federation members had depended increasingly on the export 
of coal and a growing number of its members worked in the 
Burragorang Valley mines - in 1964, for example, the number of 
miners employed in the Burragorang Valley totalled 716; by 
1970 this number had increased to 1,157.(22). Understandably, 
therefore, they believed that their continued high earnings 
depended upon the fruition of the company's plans(23).
Further opposition came from local and national conserva­
tion societies and the National Trust. Lawyers of the Council 
for Civil Liberties questioned the legality of the Clutha Act 
and Edward St. John Q.C. established the Clutha Committee in 
order to co-ordinate the activities of the numerous groups 
actively campaigning against the project(24).
Much of the trade union opposition was motivated by 
economic concerns and it appears that the trade unions were a 
major pressure group preventing the implementation of the 
d e c i s i o n . There further existed resistance of an ideological
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nature, possibly with its roots in the environmental and eco­
logical awareness movements of the 1960s. Anti-American 
sentiment, related to earlier anti-Vietnam feelings, as well 
as the growing resentment which became increasingly prevalent 
during the Whitlam years, of the corporate control of 
Australian resources by foreign-owned companies (Clutha was owned 
by the American Daniel Ludwig), was an important factor also.
An extremely powerful element in the decision-making 
process was that of the politician. The anti-Clutha campaign 
had the support of the ALP in the Federal, State and local 
Governments. In fact, membership of SCOOP was restricted to 
ALP members and in the State election in February 1971 the 
proposed Coalcliff coal loader and the repeal of the Clutha 
Act became prominent election issues. In the electorates of 
Corrimal and Heathcote the sitting ALP members increased their 
already large majorities - for example, in Corrimal, Laurie 
Kelly polled 18,311 of a total of 27,773 votes(25)and increased 
his majority from 64.1 percent in 1968 to 67.5 percent(26). 
Similarly in Heathcote, Rex Jackson polled 16,426 of 28,092 
first preference votes r e c o r d e d (27). In the electorate of 
Wollongong the ALP candidate Eric Ramsay defeated by 79 votes
(28) the sitting Liberal member (Jack Hough) who had defended
the Clutha proposal. '
Moreover, in the local Government elections in September 
1971 the ALP aldermen in Wollongong gained the majority in 
Council, with the Clutha controversy being an important issue
(29) . The ALP candidates had opposed the Coalcliff loader 
and defeated the Independent councillors who either had openly
6 2
supported or tacitly accepted the development proposal.
By early 1972, however, it had become clear that Clutha 
would not proceed with the project. Existing coal transport 
infrastructure would remain; coal would continue to be exported 
through Balmain and Port Kembla; shipping delays were increas­
ing; supporting road and rail networks were unable to cope 
with increasing demands; and the negative externalities of 
inadequate and inefficient transport infrastructure were becom­
ing increasingly serious.
An. Offshore Loader at Port Kembla?
Although some work had been carried out in the early 1970s 
to upgrade Port Kembla harbour, including the deepening of the 
harbour, the capacity of the coal loading facilities remained 
unchanged. Upgrading had resulted in larger vessels being able 
to use the port but did not increase the annual throughput.
The world oil crisis in 1973 had prompted a re-evaluation of 
coal reserves and production and it was soon predicted that 
coal consumption would escalate. By 1974 a number of new mines 
in the southern mining districts, as elsewhere, were under con­
struction or at various stages of planning (Table 3.4). These, 
it was estimated, would produce an additional 14.7 million 
tonnes per y e a r (30). It was proposed that 10.1 million tonnes 
of this coal would be shipped through Port K e m b l a (31) and 2 
million tonnes would be transported and used in steel making at 
the Australian Iron & Steel plant in Port Kembla. The balance 
would be exported through the proposed new coal loader at
Botany B a y .
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In order to be able to handle the production increase, 
the NSW Public Works Department began to investigate the 
feasibility of erecting an offshore loader at Port Kembla, as 
well as a new loader at Botany Bay. The case for the offshore 
loader was strengthened by the annual report of the Joint Coal 
Board which stated that NSW producers had more export contracts 
than they could physically handle and that coal producers could 
not increase coal export until rail transport and coal export 
facilities could cope with the increase(32).
The proposal for the offshore loader included provision 
for the accommodation of vessels up to 150,000 DWT,having a 
shiploader with a nominal capacity of 5,000 tonnes per hour (33) . 
Additional stockpile capacity of approximately 500,000 tonnes 
with new rail discharge facilities would be provided. The new 
offshore facilities would be interconnected with the existing 
plant. Consideration would be given to a second stage of de­
velopment which would cater for vessels up to 250,000 DWT and 
which would provide further stockpile capacity of up to 1.4 
million tonnes (34). Road and rail receival facilities would 
be incorporated into the project.
The new loader which was to have an annual capacity of 
15 to 18 million tonnes per y e a r , was approved by the State 
Liberal Government in October 1975, and was to be constructed 
at an approximate cost of $44 m i l l i o n (35). It was to be a 
joint venture with the NSW Combined Colliery Proprietors' 
Association financing the work and the Government providing
the land.
Although there appears to have been general agreement
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TABLE 3.4: PROPOSED NEW MINES IN SOUTHERN NSW, 1974 *
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NSW, Environment Impact Statement, Sydney, 
adapted from Table 3.1.
about the need for the facility, some concern did exist about 
the proposed safeguards against pollution, the problem of 
transporting the coal from the mines to the port and the likely 
increase in the number of coal trucks on the r o a d s (36). There 
also existed concern about the stockpile facilities and demands 
were made that coal be stored in covered bins at Port K e m b l a , 
similar to those storage facilities being planned for Botany 
B a y (37).
Wollongong Council subsequently rejected the 
Environmental Impact Statement and opposed the development of 
the loader because of potential problems concerning issues such 
as the storage of coal, dust control measures, pollution of the 
sea and the considerable increase of coal on r o a d (38).
Continuing evaluation of the relative merits of offshore 
and onshore loaders led the Public Works Department, however, 
to finally abandon the offshore proposal in favour of an on­
shore terminal - Stage 1 of which was commissioned in November
1982; (see be l o w ) .
The Proposal for a Botany Bay Loader
Between 1970 and 1976 the production of coal in NSW con­
tinued to increase and by 1975 had reached over 40 «million 
tonnes (from 35.8 million in 1970) (39). Exports also grew and 
in the two years 1975-76 and 1976-77 grew by 2.4 million 
t o n n e s (40). There were some differences however in projections 
of future coal export tonnages. The Joint Coal Board, for 
example, predicted totals of between 30 and 40 million tonnes 
(41) though Simblist estimated the range between 28.6 and 47.3
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million t o n n e s (42). Even at the lower estimate however, the 
existing facilities would be unable to handle projected re­
quirements .
The NSW Combined Colliery Proprietors'Association, on 
behalf of a consortium consisting of Coalex Proprietary 
Limited, Clutha and Austen and Butta Limited had approached 
the Maritime Services Board in April, 1974 to seek approval for 
the construction of a privately financed coal loader and wharf 
at Botany Bay. The companies had extensive mining operations 
in the Lithgow and Burragorang Valley areas and the onset of 
the oil crisis in 1973 had led to optimism in the future of the 
coal industry. It was anticipated that coal tonnages through 
the proposed loader would be 7.3 million tonnes per annum by 
1980 with the possibility of exports increasing by that time to 
10 million tonnes per annum(43).
Much of the Lithgow and Burragorang Valley coal was expor­
ted through Balmain and Port'Kembla and in 1974-75 the actual 
throughput was 2.7 million tonnes at Balmain and 3.6 million 
tonnes at Port Kembla(44). As the projected export quantities 
exceeded the capacity of the existing facilities, further load­
ing capacity for export shipments needed to be assured before 
the companies could finalise the overseas contracts for the 
increased q u a n t i t i e s (45).
In February, 1975, the then Premier, Tom Lewis, announced 
that Cabinet, on the recommendation of the Minister of Public 
Works and Ports had agreed, in principle, to the proposal 
subject to the satisfactory outcome of an inquiry by the State 
Pollution Control Commission to determine the environmental
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and economic consequences of the proposal. The State 
Pollution Control Commission announced its approval for the 
coal loader in November, 1975(46).
The proposed coal loader was to be part of a planned port 
industrial complex (Figure 3.1) and major port development 
programme. It was proposed that the new coal loader would 
handle coal primarily from the Western Districts and the 
Burragorang Valley as well as the Moss Vale area. As these 
areas were connected directly by rail to Port Botany, coal 
would be carried to the loader by rail only(47). The coal 
would be unloaded and stored in silos which were designed to 
each hold approximately 40,000 tonnes(48). It was proposed 
that initially three silos would be constructed and more would 
be provided as coal export increased.
The loader would be capable of loading vessels of up to 
130,000 DWT and at the completion of stage 1 would have an 
export capacity of 7 to 8 million tonnes per annum(49). At the 
completion of stage 2, the loader would be accommodating 
vessels up to 200,000 DWT and would have a 13 to 14 million 
tonnes capacity. A possible further stage 3 would increase the 
annual throughput capacity to approximately 20 million tonnes
(50).
The location of Botany Bay as a site for the development 
of new coal loading facilities was supported by the Maritime 
Services Board of NSW for a number of reasons including - 
; (i) The difficulty of future expansion at
Balmain because of the impossibility of 
extending the stockpile area and the
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Figure 3.1: Proposed development of Port Botany.
Maritime Services Board (1976), 
Submission to the Botany Bay Port and 
Environment E n q u i r y , Sydney.
Source :
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virtual impossibility of developing the 
berth area to handle large size vessels (51)- 
the Balmain facilities could accommodate .
vessels not exceeding 44,000 DWT(52).
(ii) The inability of the Newcastle coal loading 
facilities to economically handle coal from 
the Lithgow and Burragorang Valley mines.
The rail haulage distance and transport 
costs from these fields weighed heavily 
against Newcastle as an export port for 
such c o a l (53).
(iii) Cost differences were advantageous for the 
Botany development. It was found by the 
State Development Co-ordinating Committee 
that rail freight from the Lithgow area 
would be 38 percent greater to Port Kembla 
than to Botany Bay while the rates from the 
Burragorang Valley area would be more than 
65 percent higher to Port Kembla than to 
Botany B a y (54).
A Port Kembla location posed a further problem since there 
did not exist a rail connection between the Burragorang Valley 
and Port Kembla and coal from the Burragorang Valley to Port 
Kembla was transported by truck through Wollongong to the 
loader. Wollongong, however, already had an acute coal truck 
problem - in 1975-76, 1.7 million tonnes exported through 
Port Kembla were transported from the Burragorang Valley
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through Wollongong to Port Kembla by r o a d (55).
The Maritime Services Board, in its submission, concluded 
that since "Sydney (was) the premier maritime city and port in 
Australia and with its large population and highly developed 
industrial and commercial activities, it must retain its 
ability to trade economically if the present standard of living 
of the community ' (was) to be maintained. This (could) only be 
achieved, as far as the shipping component (was) concerned, if 
the port facilities in the area (could) safely accommodate the 
larger general cargo and bulk carrier ships which (were) becom­
ing increasingly more prevalent on the international sea routes 
of the world". Furthermore, it was the Board's view that 
"modern port facilities with spacious and deep waterways for 
the large specialised ships to serve the needs of the Sydney 
region (could) only be provided in Botany B a y " (56).
The State Pollution Control Commission also supported the 
location of a loader in Botany Bay and in its report on the en­
vironmental impact of the proposed coal loader stated that "in 
view of the employment and general economic benefits it would 
confer on the community, and having regard for the environmen­
tal controls that would be placed on its construction and 
operation, the Commission considers the proposed coal export 
facilities at Botany Bay should not be rejected on environmen­
tal grounds" (57) .
Despite the apparent necessity for extensions of coal 
loading facilities and the support and recommendations for the 
Botany Bay location of the Maritime Services Board of NSW and 
the State Pollution Control Commission, as well as the
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willingness of the consortium to finance the development, the 
implementation of the Botany Bay proposal did not eventuate.
Again, as for the Clutha project, abandonment was tied 
not to economic considerations but to the effectiveness of 
pressure groups within the decision-making process.
Lobby groups opposing development included conservation­
ists and resident action groups who demanded a Royal Commission 
into all proposed development around the Bay. Over seventy 
separate residents' groups, progress associations and other 
organisations joined to form the Botany Bay Action Committee 
(58) . The concern of the Committee was not only with the po­
tential environmental destruction and possible pollution pro­
blem, but with the rezoning of land for industrial development, 
the construction of freeways, the increase in traffic as well 
as the possible reduction in property values.
The project was opposed by the Australian Academy of 
Sciences, the Australian Academy of Humanities and the 
Australian Academy of Social Sciences. In a report by 
Professor N.G. Butlin of the Australian National University, 
it was concluded that:-
(i) the loading of coal at Port Botany appears 
to be undesirable for both economic and 
environmental reasons, and
(ii) that the proposal for export of coal from 
Port Botany should be abandoned in its 
entirety.
72
It was further recommended in the Butlin report that 
expanded coal facilities be constructed at Newcastle and that 
immediate attention be given to the transit of Burragorang 
Valley coal to Port Kembla by means other than road 
trans p o r t (59) .
Political participants in the controversy included the 
Rockdale Council who organised meetings with ten local munici­
palities in order to combine their action campaign. The 
Australian Labor Party opposed the development and the Botany 
Bay coal loader became a prominent issue in the 1976 State 
election campaign, particularly in marginal seats and Liberal 
held electorates in the vicinity of Botany Bay. ALP candi­
dates identified with concerned residents and lobby groups and 
the State ALP pledged that, if elected, it would impose a 
moratorium on the further development of Botany Bay and re­
assess the whole port development p r ogramme(60).
Groups of Botany Bay residents, who had combined to oppose 
the development, decided to exert pressure, as voters, and 
began a campaign against the then Liberal State Government.
This meant that approximately seventy local organizations with 
a membership exceeding 1,000 would campaign against the 
Government in a number of important seats. Furthermore, the 
Nature Conservation Council, representing fifty conservation 
groups throughout the state and with about 5,000 members, had 
voted to oppose the Government on the Botany Bay issue (61).
Despite the growing opposition to the Government's plans 
to proceed with the development, the Liberal Party appeared
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outwardly unperturbed. The sitting Liberal member for 
H u r s tville, Tom Mead, dismissed the Botany Bay project as a 
"non issue as far as his electorate is concerned". He further 
stated that "the Labor Party was trying to whoop up a politi­
cal front on this issue. To say that it will affect Hurstville 
is rubbish - a d i s t o r t i o n " (62). His ALP opponent, the Mayor 
of Hurstville, Kevin Ryan, on the other hand, campaigned 
strongly against the development of Botany B a y (63). At the 
State election in May 1976, Ryan defeated Mead, who had held 
the seat since 1965(64), by a total of 46 v o t e s (65). Similarly 
in the seat of Rockdale, classified as 'fairly safe Labor' (66) 
there occurred a considerable increase in ALP support (B.J. 
Bannon retained the seat for the ALP gaining 19,017 first 
preference votes over his Liberal Party opponent, R.J. 
Scaysbrook, who polled 9,597 first preference votes) (67).
With the change of Government in May 1976, the newly 
elected Labor Government halted all further work on the 
Botany Bay scheme pending an environmental impact s t u d y (68) and 
in June 1976, appointed S.H. Simblist Q.C. commissioner to in­
quire into the Botany Bay development. The terms of reference 
were to inquire into the role of the port in terms of the 
needs of the State; to inquire into the environmental impact, 
including social and economic aspects of the existing and 
planned projects within the port development, and to make re­
commendations on the future of the planned port development 
and, if necessary, make alternative p r oposals(69).
The findings and recommendations of the Botany Bay Port 
and Environment Inquiry concluded that there would be
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widespread environmental disadvantage from building a coal 
loader in Botany Bay(70). It was found that the only justifi­
cation for the choice of Botany Bay was that transport costs 
to Port Kembla exceeded transport costs to Botany Bay by some 
unquantified amount. Furthermore, economic justification for 
the coal loader was not established before the Inquiry and that 
the coal loader project should not proceed at this s t a g e (71).
It was further recommended that the Balmain coal loader be ex­
tended and improved for the short term to enable the immediate 
expansion of the western fields. In the long term, however, 
the Balmain loader should be phased out.
The Commissioner proposed that alternative solutions and 
options might include -
fi) the development of the Port Kembla off . 
shore loader;
(ii) a Douglas Park - Port Kembla rail line be 
built or alternatively the Moss Vale line 
be upgraded, or both, and that south 
western fields be required to ship through 
Port Kembla on the new rail li n e s (72).
On 14th June, 1977, Cabinet rejected the location for the 
new loader at Botany Bay and decided that Port Kembla would 
be the site for the new coal loading facilities(73). The 
decision was also made for the construction of a rail link 
from Douglas Park to Port Kembla in order to transport the 
coal from the southern and south-western fields. It was 
further decided that the Balmain loader would be upgraded and
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that the western fields would be given priority for use of an 
expanded Balmain facility. Any production which could not be 
accommodated through Balmain would be exported through Port 
K e m b l a (74).
Finally, then, after almost a decade of discussion, it 
appeared that major infrastructural change was imminent!
The Decision to Develop a New Coal Loader at Port Kembla
Simblist in his report, suggested that "economic justifi­
cation for the coal loader was not established before the 
Inquiry" and that the "proposal should not be adopted without 
the clear demonstration of a full economic justification"(75). 
The Commissioner had further stated that "although the develop­
ment of the NSW coal fields and deposits (was) being conducted 
according to the perceived commercial advantage of the entre­
preneur, the problem for the State Government,(was) whether 
this type of development (was) in the State's best interest or 
whether a more planned approach would not best serve both the 
State and the long term interests of the coal companies" (76) .
Premier Wran, when justifying the decision for locating 
the new coal loading facilities at Port Kembla also adopted 
the principle of the State's interest and argued that the 
Port Kembla site had been chosen because, although it was more 
expensive than Botany Bay, in the long term it would be more 
beneficial to the State". The estimated cost of building the 
loader at Botany Bay was between $120 and $130 million 
compared with the cost of between $160 and $180 million
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for the Port Kembla facility, depending on an inshore or 
offshore location. Of this total, $110 million would 
be spent on building a new railway from Maldon/Douglas Park, 
south-west of Campbelltown, to Port Kembla when surveys were 
c o m p l e t e d (77).
The Port Kembla loader was to handle coal from the 
southern fields, the Burragorang Valley as well as the coal i. 
from the western fields which could not be exported through 
Balmain (Figures 3.2 and 3.3). Coal would be transported to 
the export facilities by rail or road. Table 3.5 shows the 
annual production of the mines exporting through Port Kembla 
and Balmain, as well as the mode of transport used.
During 1977 coal produced in the Southern districts, the 
Burragorang Valley and the Western districts totalled 20.3 
million tonnes (78) and was exported either through the Port 
Kembla and Balmain loaders or destined for local usage. Of 
the coal used at Port Kembla or exported through the Port 
Kembla loader, 5.4 million tonnes was transported by rail, 2.4 
million tonnes by rail and road and 6.4 million tonnes by 
r o a d (79). There appears to have existed general concensus 
within the industry that annual production and export would 
continue to increase. The mines exporting through Port Kembla 
and their projected export production for 1985-1990 are shown 
in Table 3.6.
In September 1977 it was announced by the Public Works 
Minister (Jack Ferguson) that the Government had decided it 
would build an onshore coal loader at Port Kembla rather than 
the planned offshore facility. The loader, estimated to be
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Figure 3.2: Coal mines in the South Coast and Burragorang 
Valley, NSW.
Source: Department of Public Works (1978), Environmental
Impact Statement Port Kembla Coal Loader -




Coal mines in the Western District, NSW.
Department of Public Works (1978),
Environmental Impact Statement Port Kembla
Coal Loader - Summary, Sydney.
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TABLE 3.5: TRANSPORT MODES AND DESTINATIONS OF COAL FROM








Metropolitan South Coast Newcastle 0.3 rail
Coalcliff ii Port Kembla 1 . 0 rail
Coalcliff h Port Kembla 0.3 road
Coalcliff h Other 0.2 road/rail
Bulli h AIS 0.6 rail




Avon h AIS 0.4 road
Avondale h AIS 0 . 1 road
Huntley ft AIS 0.3 road
Huntley h Tallawarra o • u> road
Yellow Rock II Port Kembla 0 . 1 road
Kemira II AIS 0.7 rail
Nebo h AIS 0.7 rail
Wongawilli h AIS 0.4 rail





Westcliff h Port Kembla 0.5 road
Corr imal h AIS 0.7 road/rail
Numerous mines Burragorang Valley Port Kembla 1.8 road
h AIS 0.4 road/rail
h Balmain 1.4 road/rail
Numerous mines Western Port Kembla 0.9 rail





h AIS 0 . 1 rail
n Local Consumers 1.2 road
h Other 0.3 road/rail
* Source: Department of Public Works (1978), Environmental Impact
Statement Port Kembla Coal Loader - Summary, Sydney.
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constructed at a cost of $70 million (80) would be owned . 
by the State Government and operated by the Maritime Services 
Board and would have an initial throughput capacity of .12-15 
million tonnes per annum with the potential of further expan­
sion to 20 million tonnes per annum(81). The harbour would be 
deepened in order to permit fully laden vessels of 110,000 to 
120,000 DWT to sail at high tide(82). The operation of the 
facility would be based primarily on inward transport by rail, 
though a road receival terminal would be provided to receive 
coal from existing mines not serviced by rail. The capacity of 
the road receival facility would be restricted to 3.5 million 
tonnes per year (82).
Stockpiles would have an initial capacity of 850,000 
tonnes and, unlike those proposed for Botany Bay, would be 
open. This decision had been reached because of the alleged 
increased fire risk presented with enclosed stock piles. 
Furthermore, the costs involved in erecting covered stockpile 
installations would place a severe economic handicap on coal 
exported through such a facility. In fact, the Environmental 
Impact Statement concluded that "open stockpiles are aestheti­
cally preferable as their form when viewed from vantage points 
around Wollongong will be ever changing (each discrete stock­
pile will vary from empty to full) whilst covered storage ■ 
would present a permanent prominent and monotonous view (83).
In order to avoid the potential generation of wind born 
dust, an agglomerating agent would be used which would lead to 
the formation of an erosion resistant crust on stockpile
Provision would also be made for low volume, finelysurfaces.
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TABLE 3.6: PROJECTED EXPORT PRODUCTION FOR MINES EXPORTING 
THROUGH PORT KEMBLA, 1985-1990.* (million tonnes)








South Bulli 1.6 0.2
Huntley - 0.6
Yellow Rock 0.2 -
Bulli - Closed
















Hartley Main 1.0 -
Ulan 0.5 - 1.5 -
* Source: Department of Public Works (1978) 





atomized water spraying of stock piles. The sprays would 
operate automatically when wind velocity exceeded a pre-set 
figure, but would be subject to optional manual control to 
satisfy any unusual set of conditions(84).
The announcement by the State Government of the decision 
to locate the new loader at Port Kembla was welcomed by most 
sections of the community and passively accepted by others.
Merv Nixon, the Secretary of the South Coast Labour Council, 
stated that "the coal loader should and would be built at Port 
Kembla because it would be criminal to despoil Botany Bay 
further" (85) . However, it did create concern about the environ­
ment and the possible intensification of an already serious 
problem created by coal trucks, in the event of the proposed 
rail facilities not being constructed simultaneously. There 
was widespread demand for covered silos, as had been proposed 
for Botany Bay, and the South Coast Labour Council, the Port 
Kembla Waterside Workers' Federation and the Wollongong Chamber 
of Commerce (86) demanded environmental safeguards equivalent 
to those proposed for Botany Bay.
In May 1978 the State Government announced its decision 
to postpone the Maldon — Port Kembla link and instead it pro­
posed to upgrade the Moss Vale — Unanderra line, increasing its 
annual coal carrying capacity to 9.6 million tonnes. It was 
also proposed to upgrade the Illawarra line and increase its 
annual coal carrying capacity to 6.7 million tonnes(87).
However, in August 1978, the NSW Public Works and Ports 
Minister, (Jack Ferguson), announced that there would not be a 
need for new rail facilities as the existing road and rail
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network could handle all the traffic necessary to fulfil the 
first stage of the coal loader development(88). The decision 
not to upgrade the existing rail facilities nor to develop new 
rail lines was based on the recommendation in the Environmental 
Impact Statement which stated that as "the capacity of the 
transport system to deliver coal to the loader, given that 
existing rail facilities and road receival restricted to a max­
imum of 3.5 million tonnes per year, is estimated at 14 to 14.5 
million tonnes per year, the estimated capacity of the trans­
port network is sufficient to service stage 1 of the loader. 
However, an increase in the transport capacity will be required 
to enable the loader to expand beyond its stage 1 throughput 
and take advantage of its potential capacity of upwards of 20 
million tonnes per y e a r " (89).
On 28th September, 1978, the South Coast Labour Council 
placed a total ban on the construction of the new loader at 
Port Kembla and Nixon, the Council's secretary, stated that 
"the ban would not be lifted until certain conditions were met". 
These were:-
(i) that the State extend the time to study 
the Environmental Impact Statement by 
three months from 1st October, 1978;
(il) that the State Government provides a 
guarantee of alternate ship repair 
facilities;
(iii) that the State Government guarantee that 
all associated rail facilities would be
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complete before operation, and
(iv) that the State Government guarantees 
that some parts for the coal loader 
would be manufactured by local 
f i r m s (90).
The South Coast Labour Council ban reflected the general 
dissatisfaction with the Environmental Impact Statement. Con­
cerning the conditions imposed by the Labour Council, Nixon 
stated, "we worked hard with two unions - the Federated Engine 
Drivers and Firemens' Association and the Amalgamated Metal 
Workers and Shipwrights Union - to have the loader sited here 
and not at Botany Bay and until such time as the Council gets 
answers, no work will be done on the l o a der"(91).
A conference was held in Wollongong in December 1978, in 
order to resolve the conflict and there emerged a strong re­
commendation that road-hauled coal to the new loader would be 
limited to 2 million tonnes per y e a r (92). This could be 
achieved, it was suggested, by transporting coal from South 
Bulli mine by rail, rather than by road, to Port Kembla. The 
State Pollution Control Commission recommendation of a 2 
million tonnes limit of road hauled coal was accepted by 
Deputy Premier Ferguson, who indicated, at the Conference, 
that "he proposed to go back to Cabinet as soon as they meet 
again to indicate to the Cabinet that there is a strong im­
pression of opinion that we should reduce it to 2 million 
tonnes per year and get their recommendation"(93).
The South Coast Labour Council subsequently voted to lift
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all bans on the loader on the condition that the Government 
honour all assurances concerning coal transport, the provision 
of a ship repair berth and the proposals concerning environment 
p r o t e c t i o n (94).
When the development application for the new loader was 
lodged with the Wollongong City Council, the issue of road 
versus rail transport of coal again created controversy. A 
report prepared by the Wollongong Council's senior environment 
officer on the development application, showed that the 2 
million tonnes limit of road hauled coal could be exceeded 
because the loader would have the capacity to receive between 
9 and 13 million tonnes of coal by road. Furthermore, it was 
believed that if road haulage was, in fact, restricted to 2 
million tonnes, the rail receival facilities would be inade­
quate and would not have the capacity to handle the b a lance(95).
While lobbying by pressure groups continued in the 
Wollongong area to ensure a reduction in road transport, pre­
ssure was being exerted by a Camden-based lobby group which 
was actually promoting road transport and calling for the up­
grading of roads for coal transport. The Road Transport 
Association Camden division put forward the proposal for the 
construction of the so-called F5^ road which would link Wilton 
and the top of Mt. Ousley, allowing the continued road haulage 
of Burragorang Valley coal. The F5^ plan proposed the con­
struction of a four lane freeway between the South Western 
Freeway (F5) and the southern extension of the Southern Freeway 
(F6) . The proposal was rejected by the Government because it 
was seen to be in "direct conflict with the Government's firm
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policy of maximising the use of rail for delivery of c o a l " (96).
In November 1979, the Deputy Premier reaffirmed that the 
NSW Government (had) a policy to reduce road haulage of coal 
to Port Kembla from the present 4 million tonnes to 2 million 
tonnes per annum by the time the new coal loader (was) in 
operation late in 1982. Further he announced that "the 
Government was continuing with its plans for achieving this 
reduction by transferring South Bulli and Burragorang Valley 
coal from road to rail and negotiations were currently pro­
ceeding with the coal compa n i e s " (97).
In order to achieve the transfer of South Bulli coal to 
rail the Public Transport Commission in June 1980 proposed the 
construction of a coal loading station near Bellambi. (In 
1980 South Bulli produced 1.7 million to n n e s (98) all of which 
was road hauled either to local consumers or to the Port 
Kembla loader for export). The proposal included a new 120,000 
tonnes stockpile at the colliery. An underground conveyor 
system from the washery would transport the coal to an over­
head rail loading bin. The bin would be 39.5 metres high with 
a capacity of 2,650 tonnes from which rail coal waggons would 
be loaded (99). The overhead loading bin would be positioned 
midway between the residential areas of Woonona and Bulli in 
order to maximise noise attenuation and minimise visual and 
dust i m p a c t s (100), (Figure 3.4).
The Department of Environment and Planning, in the con­
clusion of the Environmental Impact Assessment, recommended 
that approval be given as soon as possible so that the faci­





Figure 3.4: Proposed location of the Bellambi coal bin.
Source : Department of Environment and Planning (1981) ,
Proposed Rail Loading Facility Serving South Bu l l i , Sydney.
88
Kembla coal loader. The Department stated that without a 
facility such as the one proposed, it would not be possible 
to achieve the objective of reducing the road haulage of coal 
through W o l l o n g o n g (101).
The proposal met with considerable opposition from local 
residents and a nearby clothing manufacturer. Despite this, 
the Wollongong City Council's Environment Committee recommen­
ded the proposal be implemented. A Commission of Inquiry was 
held in October 1981, which recommended that approval for 
development be given. Shortly afterwards, in December 1981, 
the State Government approved the Bellambi Coal Company's 
$16 million coal silo and related development. The decision 
meant that the company would send all South Bulli mine coal to 
Port Kembla by rail and it would eliminate an estimated 500 
truck journeys a day through the northern suburbs of 
W o l l o n g o n g (102).
Despite the severe coal truck problem in the Wollongong 
area, the Bellambi coal bin project did not eventuate because 
the Transport Workers' Union imposed a ban preventing the 
delivery of concrete, steel and fuel for the project(103) .
The ban by the Transport Workers' Union was imposed because 
the transfer of coal from road to rail would have meant the 
loss of jobs of 36 truck drivers - all members of the TWU.
The TWU was also concerned about the loss of 300 jobs of 
coal truck drivers in the Burragorang Valley where Clutha had 
also been ordered to transport coal by rail. The Union stated 
that it supported coal on rail for mines which could be linked
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with the rail system. However, for the Burragorang Valley 
mines it supported the construction of a freight-only road 
to Port Kembla(104).
Early in November 1982, the Premier announced that the 
promised road haulage limit of 2 million tonnes per annum would 
be lifted to 4 million tonnes and that an immediate start would 
be made to economic planning and the preparation of 
Environmental Impact Statements for the Maldon - Dombarton 
rail link, as well as stage 2 of the coal loader. The Premier 
stated that the higher limit set on road-hauled coal was 
necessary in order to preserve every job possible in the mining 
and road transport industries.
The Government further gave permission to Bellambi Coal 
Company to continue road haulage of coal from the South Bulli 
mine, pending its decision to relocate its pit head over the 
escarpment at West Bellambi. The pit head relocation would 
allow the company to abandon plans to build a coal storage bin 
near Bellambi. Yellow Rock, Avon and Westcliff mines would 
also continue road haulage while Clutha would be permitted to 
road-haul some coal from the Burragorang Valley to Port Kembla. 
However, Clutha's coal was to be mainly rail-hauled to Balmain 
until the new rail link to Port Kembla was built(105). This 
agreement was not carried out. In 1982 the Burragorang Valley 
mines produced 3.5 million tonnes of coal. Of this 595,000 
tonnes was transported by rail to Balmain, 394,000 by rail to 
Port Kembla and 1.4 million tonnes by road to Port Kembla(106).
The Government's decision to lift the limit of road hauled 
coal was welcomed by the Transport Workers' Union. However,
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the Australian Railways' Union, in response, placed a ban on 
coal delivery to the new loader for the official opening on 
the 22nd November, 1982, when the new loader was opened.by 
Premier Wran - with no coal, no ships and maintenance men 
working to rectify a loader breakdown(107)!
From the State Government's decision to construct an off­
shore terminal at Coalcliff to the commissioning of a new coal 
loader in Port Kembla spanned a period of fourteen years.
Other major infrastructural developments, including new road 
and rail links, had also been proposed. The decision-making 
and implementation processes have been complex and the power 
plays intricate and the following chapters examine, in some­
what greater detail, the particular roles of the State 
Government, the trade unions and the pressure groups in creat­
ing new patterns of transport infrastructure or in preserving 
existing patterns.
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CHAPTER 4: DISJOINTED INCREMENTALISM; GOVERNMENT ACTION AND 
INACTION IN INFRASTRUCTURAL DECISION-MAKING
The rational decision-making model suggests that the 
decision maker is able to choose among all possible courses of 
action and to investigate all possible consequences. A com­
parison of the consequences enables choice of policy which 
matches most closely the decision maker's goal structures. A 
rational choice is defined as one which meets these criteria.
It seems even at the most superficial level, that such a 
conceptualisation can only be regarded as inappropriate and 
inaccurate and does not describe the locational decision­
making process responsible for coal transport infrastructural 
projects in southern NSW. Rather, Lindblom's (1) 'notion of 
'disjointed incrementalism' appears to offer a more adequate 
and accurate conceptual frame. In order to examine the nature 
of the transport infrastructural locational decision-making 
process, and more particularly to assess the actions of 
Government in the process, it is hypothesised that even when 
integrated and co-ordinated planning does occur, the implemen­
tation stage of the decision-making process is disjointed and 
unco—ordinated because of the incremental characteristics of 
the implementation process. Moreover, incrementalism reflects 
the inability or reluctance of the decision maker, in this 
case Government, to provide resources sufficient for the
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completion of the policy plan as well as the participation in 
the decision-making process of powerful interest groups which 
may, in order to promote or protect their own vested interests, 
prevent the implementation of the policy plan.
The hypothesis is examined with specific reference to the 
numerous infrastructural development plans or proposals, parti­
cularly those relating to road and rail links which have been 
proposed as important, even essential, in the development of an 
efficient handling system for the export of coal from southern 
NSW. This chapter traces the background to the considerable 
variety of infrastructure proposals suggested over the period, 
from the announcement that a new coal loader would be construc­
ted in Port Kembla (1977) to mid 1984. Interestingly, with the 
exception of the construction of the F5 southern freeway and 
the upgrading of a number of roads and sections of rail line, 
not a single project aimed at 'solving' the problem of coal 
transport between mines and port coal loader has been implemen­
ted. The remainder of the chapter details these proposals.
New Rail Links - Maldon/Douglas Park to Port Kembla or 
Duplication of the Moss Vale to Unanderra Line?
When Botany Bay was abandoned as a site for a new coal 
loader and the Premier of NSW announced in June 1977 that the 
alternate site would be at Port Kembla, Wollongong was exper­
iencing chronic coal-related transport problems - in 1976-77, 
for example, 6.4 million tonnes of coal was transported to 
Port Kembla for local use or for export(2). This included 1.1 
million tonnes of coal moved by road from Westcliff, 1.4 million 
tonnes from South Bulli and 1.5 million tonnes from Burragorang
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Valley mines. Furthermore it was clear that the location of 
a new coal loader at Port Kembla with a capacity of twice the 
existing annual throughput would intensify an already serious 
coal haulage problem.
In order to resolve this problem and remove the coal 
trucks from the roads the State Government announced that it 
would construct a railway line from Maldon/Douglas Park to 
Port Kembla "•••as soon as surveys (were) completed"(3),
(Figure 4.1).
It was proposed that the line would branch from the Main 
Southern Line near Maldon. It would bridge the Nepean River 
and traverse farmland and the Cordeaux Dam catchment area. A 
tunnel 13 kms long would be constructed and emerge near Nebo 
Colliery. The railway would then run parallel to the existing 
AlS-owned rail line to Port K e m b l a (4). The line would be con­
structed at an estimated cost of $109.3 million and would 
have a capacity of 18.9 million tonnes per annum. It was, 
according to the Premier, an "essential part of the 
Government's plans to shift coal by rail and not road"(5).
Although the announcement did not specify the mines to be 
served by the new line, it was apparent that Burragorang Valley 
coal would be transported by road to Maldon thence'by rail to 
Port K e m b l a (6). Coal from the Western fields would be given 
preference at Balmain and the excess would be exported through 
Port Kembla. The new rail line would reduce the distance from 
Glenlee to Port Kembla to 61 kms compared with the distance via 
the Illawarra line of 133 kms.
-  101 -
Figure 4.1: Coal-related' transport infrastructure in southern NSW: 
existing and proposed new rail links, 1977.
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Although the specific routing of the rail line had not 
been determined, concern and reservation was voiced by Clutha, 
who owned all the Burragorang Valley mines, Austen and Butta, 
and Coalex, who also owned mines in the Western fields. Simi­
larly, the Illawarra Region Port & Railway Community Advisory 
Committee expressed doubts that the Maldon - Port Kembla 
railway link represented the best method for haulage of 
c o a l (7) .
In May 1978 the State Government halted plans for the 
development of the Maldon - Port Kembla line and instead 
announced that it was planning a $30.5 million duplication of 
the Moss Vale - Unanderra line and that the Illawarra line 
would be upgraded. The proposed duplication and upgrading 
work (Figure 4.2) would increase the carrying capacity of the 
Moss Vale - Unanderra line to 9.6 million tonnes per year and 
the Illawarra line to 6.7 million tonnes per year. It was pro 
posed that coal from the Burragorang Valley would be loaded 
onto rail at Camden and transported along the Main Southern 
line, then along the Moss Vale — Unanderra line to Port Kembla 
Coal from the Western fields, exported through Port Kembla, 
would be transported by rail through Sydney suburbs including 
Lidcombe, Tempe and along the Illawarra line to Port Kembla(8) 
In order to divert traffic away from the metropolitan system, 
a rail link was considered between St. Mary's and Glenlee 
(Figure 4.1). This line would branch from the Main Western 
line near St. Mary's and join the Main Southern line near 
Glenlee. The cost of this 38.5 km link, excluding signalling 
and land acquisition, was estimated at $46 million(9).
- 103 -
Figure 4.2: Coal-related transport infrastructure in southern NSW:
proposed rail links, 1978-79.
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The proposal was abandoned by the Government when it was 
announced in August 1978, by the NSW Minister for Public Works 
and Ports, Jack Ferguson, that the existing road and rail 
transport network could handle all the traffic necessary to 
fulfil the first stage of the coal loader development(10).
The change of Government plans was made on the recommenda­
tion contained in the Environmental Impact Statement for the 
Port Kembla coal loader which suggested that the "estimated 
capacity of the transport network is sufficient to service 
stage 1 of the loader proposal". It further stated that "an 
increase in the transport capacity (would) not be required 
until Balmain (was) closed and when stage 2 was implemented and 
potential capacity of the loader was 20 million tonnes per 
year" (11) .
An investigation carried out by Transmark, a consulting 
firm, on behalf of the Public Transport Commission of NSW 
supported the findings of the Environmental Impact Statement 
that the 1985 coal tonnages would not justify construction of 
a new route from Maldon toPPort K e m b l a (12). The Transmark 
report further stated that as the coal carrying capacity of 
the Southern line was 12.5 million tonnes(13) and the 
Illawarra line had a carrying capacity of 17.2 million tonnes 
(14) , it was concluded that existing rail facilities were ade­
quate to serve the 1985 requirements as the present coal ship­
ments total about 12 million tonnes per year and without track 
alterations the system could theoretically accommodate 30 
million tonnes provided that locomotives and wagons were 
obtained. Furthermore, the Moss Vale - Unanderra line, which
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would now be used for diversionary purposes had an existing 
capacity of 2.5 million tonnes per year. However, with up­
grading, it had a potential handling capacity of 10 million 
tonnes and duplication of the route would increase the capa­
city to 16.4 million tonnes(15). It was found that provided 
an investment of $28 million was made for track enhancement 
and $23 million for associated signalling, the rail infrastruc­
ture network would have a carrying capacity of 48 million 
ton n e s (16) .
The Government's decision not to construct both new rail 
lines and to upgrade existing lines was supported by the State 
Pollution Control Commission in the Environmental Impact 
Assessment for the Port Kembla coal loader, suggesting that 
"there is sufficient evidence to show that the existing rail 
system can accommodate stage 1 throughput of coal (17). The 
Commission did recommend that road receival facilities would 
be required although these were to be restricted to those 
existing mines for which access to rail was impracticable. 
However, the Commission was not satisfied "that adequate powers 
(were) available to ensure the maximum haulage of coal by rail 
where this was practicable". Among its recommendations to 
attain this, it was suggested by the Commission that South 
Bulli coal be transferred to rail as soon as possible(18) .
Despite the Government's overt commitment to rail trans­
port of coal and its optimistic views concerning the existing 
rail capacity, opposition existed to Government policy by coal 
producers. Rendel's Economics, in a report completed on behalf 
of Clutha, expressed doubts concerning the ability of the
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Public Transport Commission to be able to move the 20 million 
tonnes by rail in 1985(19).
The NSW Road Transport Association claimed that the road 
transport of coal from west of the escarpment would be "the 
most efficient, cheapest and environmentally acceptable method 
of transport to the Port Kembla coal loader". An Association’s 
representative (Alderman Peter B o l t ) , claimed that the objec­
tion to coal trucks had become an emotional issue. The opening 
of the Master's Road deviation, he suggested, had eliminated 
coal haulage from the residential areas of Wollongong, and the 
only problem of coal haulage through residential and commercial 
areas was haulage from South Bulli Colliery through Corrimal 
and Fairy Meadow - and this accounted for only a small percen­
tage of the traffic through those a r e a s (20).
The Illawarra Region Port and Railway Community Advisory 
Committee, a Government appointed committee, had, since its in­
ception, promoted coal on rail. In July 1978, the Committee 
recommended that -
(i) steps should be taken to reduce the volume 
and intensity of road haulage of coal;
(ii) an early investigation of sites for tran­
shipment from road to rail, as a means of 
phasing out road haulage, should be 
c o mpleted;
(iii) consideration should be given to levying 
escalating handling charges for coal 
delivered by road to ensure effective
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implementation of Government policy for 
maximum rail haulage of c o a l (21).
The Committee further recommended that "no further appro­
val to expansion of existing mines or to the establishment of 
new mines in the Southern, South Western and Western coal­
fields be given unless and until environmentally acceptable 
modes of conveyance (were) available for the handling of in­
creased or new p r o d u c t i o n " (22); and in September 1978, stressed 
that coal transport was 'a vital issue' and reiterated its 
support for maximum haulage of coal by rail and minimum haulage 
by r o a d (23).
It also expressed its belief that the Maldon - Port Kembla 
railway link did not appear to achieve the maximum haulage of 
coal by rail and that there might be better alternatives(24) . 
However, the Committee did recommend that the upgrading of the 
standards and capacity of the Illawarra and Moss Vale - 
Unanderra lines be given thè highest possible priority in the 
Government's budget and prog r a m m e s (25).
An alternative, subsequently proposed by the Committee, 
was for a rail link from Douglas Park to Helensburgh (Figure 
4.2). This railway link was recommended because it could link 
the Western fields, the Burragorang Valley and the Southern 
areas and could serve a large number of existing and future 
collieries including Bargo, Tahmoor, Tower, Appin, West 
Ballambi, Westcliff, Northcliff, Midcliff, Eastcliff, North 
Bulli and Darkes Forest. Coal from these mines would be hauled 
along the new rail line and at a point near Helensburgh, link
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into the Illawarra line to Port Kembla.
Coal from Cordeaux and Corrimal N o.3 collieries would 
continue to be road hauled to O'Brien's Drift, thence by a 
private conveyor and railway to the Port Kembla steelworks.
It was also recommended by the Committee that coal from South 
Bulli and Coalcliff collieries be transported by rail and that 
receival of coal from the Western fields be transported by 
rail only (26).
Despite the Government's overt commitment to coal on rail, 
no major infrastructure changes were implemented. This does 
not appear to have been as a result of powerful pressure groups 
opposing the developments, as has occurred with subsequent pro­
posals. Rather, non-action reflected the reluctance or inabil­
ity of Government to allocate the required resources, possibly 
because funds were not available though it was also related to 
increasing uncertainty in market conditions for export coal. 
Thus, despite its repeated commitment to the rail transport of 
coal, the Government was in fact adopting a 'wait and see' 
attitude.
Alternate Proposals - New Roads, Conveyors or Pipelines?
Despite its failure to implement a number of rail options, 
Government's commitment to reduce road haulage of coal to the 
port led to the initial proposal that road haulage levels 
would be restricted to 3.5 million tonnes per year. However, 
as a result of concern expressed about the adequacy of the en­
vironmental safeguards at the loader, as well as the fact that 
these were seen to be inferior to those proposed for the
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Botany Bay loader, pressure was exerted on the Government by 
interest groups, including the Trades and Labour Council and 
the Illawarra Region Port and Railway Community Advisory •
Committee. The Government's response to this pressure was to 
make a further decision to reduce the amount of coal hauled by 
road to the loader to a maximum of 2 million tonnes per year.
In order to meet this new commitment of a reduced amount 
of road-hauled coal and since the Government had failed to 
achieve the transfer of coal onto rail, as promised, a number 
of further strategies were proposed. These further plans were 
proposed not by Government, however, as were earlier ones, but 
by coal companies,which had been given an ultimatum by the 
Government to transfer coal to rail or reduce production, and 
by interest groups, including the Transport Workers' Union, 
which had a vested interest in retaining jobs for its coal 
truck drivers and which opposed the transfer of coal to rail.
In 1979 a proposal was made by the Camden division of the 
NSW Road Transport Association for the construction of a 
freight corridor by-passing Wollongong and a new four lane 
freeway, to: be known as the F5^. The proposed F5^ would be a 
link between the F5 freeway at Wilton and the F6 freeway at 
Mt. Ousley (Figure 4.3). The freight corridor would remove 
coal trucks from the Mt. Ousley Road and instead would provide 
a four lane road for use by trucks only, trending south and 
descending from Harry Graham Drive, under the Princes Highway 
at Figtree, and continue to the port facilities at Port Kembla
The cost of the project was estimated at $60 million.
The new road would carry all coal from Burragorang Valley and
- iio -
Figure’4.3: Coal-related transport infrastructure in southern NSW: 
road and conveyor proposals, 1978-82.
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therefore, not surprisingly, had the support of Clutha. U 
Support for the proposal also came from other coal companies - 
Austen and Butta, who owned mines in the Western fields, Bargo 
Collieries who owned the Bargo mine and the BHP Steel Division 
Collieries - as well as from the Transport Workers' Union(27). 
However, the Department of Main Roads opposed the construction 
of the F5^ proposal because "it (was) in direct conflict with 
the Government's firm policy of maximizing the use of rail for 
delivery of coal" (28) and the Government refused permission for 
development. There was, however, persistent pressure from the 
Transport Workers' Union though in February 1980, when the 
Union again approached the Premier, he commented firmly that 
"the State Government had no intention of re-opening the debate 
on the proposed F5h and freight corridor — the F5% (is) 'as 
dead as a d o d o ' " (29).
Numerous other alternative proposals for the transport 
of coal to the port were suggested and though,in some cases, 
planning had reached quite advanced stages, the proposed pro­
jects were shelved.
In 1980, the Lend Lease Corporation proposed the develop­
ment of a conveyor system from the West Bellambi mine, located 
on the plateau west of the escarpment, to the port (Figure 4.3) 
It was to be constructed in conjunction with the St. Mary's/ 
Glenlee railway line and would link Wilton to Port Kembla and 
West Bellambi, Cordeaux and Corrimal Number 3 collieries and 
O'Brien's Drift. The proposal had the support of Clutha as
well as BHP who owned Clutha mines at the t i m e (30). The con
* . i • , i i i 04- m s k  ̂q — m  pnlee rs 1 1 1 ink ̂ wo liIdveyor, together with the St. Mary s ^
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therefore serve the coalfields of the Western district as well 
as mines in the Burragorang Valley. The Lend Lease proposal 
was abandoned in May 1982, allegedly as a consequence of the 
downturn of the coal industry in the S t a t e (31).
Another proposal for a conveyor was investigated by the 
mining company, Kembla Coal and Coke, as a solution to its 
problem of transferring its Westcliff colliery coal from road 
haulage to rail. At the time the Westcliff colliery was ex­
porting 1.5 million tonnes of coal per year by road to the 
port facilities.
Furthermore, the company was anticipating the possible 
extension of its mining operations to include the proposed 
Northcliff and Midcliff collieries, further increasing road 
haulage if an alternative mode of transport was not developed 
(Figure 4.3).
Although a specific route location was not decided upon, 
it was proposed that the conveyor would transport coal from 
Westcliff, Northcliff, Midcliff and Coalcliff collieries to 
the Illawarra line to a point south of Scarborough tunnel 
(Figure 4.3). The cost of the conveyor would be approximately 
$20 m i l l i o n (32). Coal would be brought down the escarpment on 
a conveyor belt to a receival and rail siding and then be 
railed on the Illawarra line direct to Port Kembla.
In 1982 a further proposal was made by the Transport 
Workers' Union, this time for the construction of a coal 
road - pipeline link to Port Kembla (Figure 4.3). A special 
coal truck route from the F5 freeway at Wilton was to be
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constructed - similar to that proposed for the F5^ - to a 
stockpile on the escarpment. A pneumatic capsule pipeline 
would transport the coal the remaining 15 kilometres to the 
coal l o a d e r (33).
The project was proposed specifically to meet the demands 
of the mine workers in the Burragorang Valley. The Government 
had exerted pressure on Clutha to place its coal on rail and 
although some Burragorang Valley coal was transported to 
Balmain by rail, increasing quantities were being transported 
by road to Port Kembla. In 1978-79, for example, 1.6 million 
tonnes of coal from Burragorang Valley were sent by road to 
facilities in Port Kembla; by 1980-81, this total had reached
2.2 million tonnes (compared with 1.2 million and 0.8 million 
tonnes railed to Balmain for the two y e a r s ) (34).
If the Government was to meet its commitment of a 2 
million tonnes road limit to the new Port Kembla coal loader, 
it was essential that all Burragorang Valley as well as South 
Bulli mine coal be transported by means other than road trans­
port. However, road transport was considered the least costly 
mode of transport for Burragorang Valley coal, which was 
already in a state of depression. Coal exports had gradually 
declined from 3 .J5 million tonnes in 1979-80 to 2.4 million 
tonnes in 1981-82. As a result, employment in the Burragorang 
Valley mines had decreased from 1,563 in 1981 to 1,157 in 1983 
(35) . If the Government enforced its policy to get Burragorang 
Valley coal off the roads, then the jobs of 300 coal truck 
drivers - members of the Transport Workers' Union - would be
in j e o p a r d y (36).
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The proposal had the support of Clutha whose only other 
viable option, if the Government was to enforce its policy, was 
by rail along the main Southern line to Sydney and south to 
Port Kembla along the Illawarra line. Clutha was unwilling to 
utilise this lengthy and costly mode of transport for its coal, 
particularly because of the industry's economic problems. The 
proposal was also supported by the Combined Mining unions, 
Camden Council, Camden Chamber of Commerce and Camden Coal and 
Bulk Haulage Limited.
The Bellambi Coal Company, like Clutha was also under 
pressure to cease road haulage of its coal. In 1981-82 South 
Bulli produced almost 2 million tonnes of coal, all of which 
was transported by r o a d (37).
In order, therefore, to transfer coal from South Bulli 
mine to rail, the construction of an underground conveyor was 
proposed which would transport the coal from the washery to an 
overhead rail loading bin, near Bellambi, on the Illawarra line 
(see Chapter 3, Figure 3.4). From there coal would be trans­
ported by rail to Port Kembla.
The proposal for the conveyor link to the Illawarra line 
meant that all South Bulli mine coal would be sent to Port 
Kembla by conveyor and rail, which would eliminate an estima­
ted 500 truck journeys each day through the northern suburbs 
of Woll o n g o n g (38). However, it also meant the loss of jobs of 
36 truck drivers - again, all members of the Transport Workers 
Union i
The project was approved by the Government. But, with 
little delay and impressive decisiveness, the Transport Workers
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Union, protective of jobs for its truck-driver members, im­
posed a ban on the supply of construction materials to the 
proposed bin. As an alternative, the Union suggested that 
the Northern Distributor be built as a coal haulage route, 
together with the construction of the freight corridor, in 
order to preserve the jobs of its members in the Burragorang 
Valley. The Transport Workers' Union Secretary at the time, 
stated that "the only long term solution to the whole question 
of coal transport, which would preserve jobs and be practica­
ble, was the construction of a heavy freight road on top of 
the escarpment". He further stated that the Transport Workers' 
Union "was still adamant no work would proceed on the Bellambi 
bin project until that freight road goes ahead"(39).
The Maldon-Dombarton - Port Kembla Line Again
Although the rail line from Maldon to the Port Kembla coal 
loader was first announced in June 1977, its construction had 
been, to this time, 'postponed'. Moreover, as a result of the 
failure to implement a number of other infrastructure propo-; 
sals, the Government was unable to meet its commitment to a 
2 million tonnes per year limit on road-hauled coal. Mean­
while, with progressive increases in production and export, 
despite some slackening of demand in the early 1980s, the 
transport of coal through the urban Illawarra continued to 
generate a considerable range of negative externalities. It 
is clear, however, that the amount of road-hauled coal far 
exceeded the proposed 2 million tonnes and that some major 
action was required to ameliorate the serious transport problem.
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The 'solution' was announced by the Premier on 4th 
November, 1983 - a new limit of 4 million tonnes(40) per year 
would be placed on road-hauled coal and an immediate start 
would be made to the planning and preparation of an 
Environmental Impact Statement for the earlier-proposed 
Maldon rail link. In addition, Stage 2 of the coal loader at 
Port Kembla would be initiated(41).
It was recommended that the State Rail Authority would 
construct the 'new' project, at a cost of $160 million, and 
that it would be completed in three y e a r s (42). The line would 
extend from the main Southern line at Maldon to Dombarton where 
it would pass through a tunnel and join the Moss Vale - ..
Unanderra line to Port Kembla. It was proposed that coal 
roads would be built from North Bulli, Midcliff and Wedderburn 
mines to Westcliff. A railway line would also be constructed 
from Westcliff mine past the Appin and Tower mines to West 
Bellambi. From West Bellambi, coal would be carried along the 
Maldon-Dombarton line to Port Kembla(Figure 4.4).
However, when the Environmental Impact Statement was re­
leased in October 1983, the proposal had once again undergone 
some changes (Figure 4.4). In that Statement it appeared that 
the line would run from the main Southern line at Maldon, pass 
through a tunnel at Dombarton and join the Moss Vale - 
Unanderra line at the Dombarton loop. That section of the 
Moss Vale - Unanderra line from Dombarton to Port Kembla would 
be duplicated (43) . However, the proposed rail link from 
Westcliff to West Bellambi was now no longer part of the ne 
proposal nor the coal roads from the new proposed mines to
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Figure 4.4: Coal-related transport infrastructure in southern NSW: 




The new Maldon-Dombarton - Port Kembla line would have a 
capacity of 24 trains per day in each direction, though this 
capacity would not be reached until after 1990. On current 
projections the number of coal trains using the Maldon - 
Port Kembla railway, pre-1991, would average eight or nine 
trains per day in each direction giving a total of between 6 
and 6.5 million tonnes annually. Of these coal trains, one 
or two would load at West Bellambi (if operating), with a 
further one or two from Tahmoor and the remainder from the 
Burragorang Valley and the Western fields(44).
Construction of the new rail line actually commenced in 
December.1983 - three months before a State election - with the 
Premier noting that "in years to come this event (would) be 
remembered. We are going to spend $160 million and create 
thousands of j o b s " (45).
On 15th June, 1984, however, less than three months after 
the State Government elections in March 1984, it was announced 
by the Government it did not in fact, have the funds to com­
plete the rail link within three years, as promised; it would 
instead, concentrate its resources on completing the electri­
fication link to Port Kembla on the main Sydney - Jllawarra 
line by 1986 (46). It was now proposed by the Premier, never­
theless, that the Maldon - Port Kembla rail line would be com­
pleted within five years(47).
The Premier was accused of using the Maldon-Dombarton 
Port Kembla rail project as an "election stunt to hoodwink the
119
people of Wollongong" (48) and it is probable that the promise 
of the long awaited rail link was carefully timed to obtain 
the support of the voters - particularly in view of the- fact 
that the seat of Wollongong was then classified as 'marginal 
Labour'. It had been held by Eric Ramsay for the ALP since 
1971 and in the 1981 election Ramsay had only narrowly defeated 
Frank Arkell, the Independent Lord Mayor of Wollongong, (by a 
majority of 51 votes (49) out of a total of almost 30,000 votes 
polled). In 1984 Ramsay retired from politics and did not 
contest the seat and, in March elections, Arkell narrowly de­
feated his 'new' ALP opponent (Rex Connor) by 83 votes(50) 
polling 47 percent of first preference v o t e s (51). Problems 
associated with the coal loader and with coal transport were, 
in fact, major election issues for the Independent candidate(52)
The Liberal opposition presented conflicting points of 
view about the Maldon-Dombarton - Port Kembla rail link, rais­
ing doubts about the future .of the project. The Liberal candi­
date for the seat of Corrimal told a public meeting that the 
Opposition thought the partly-constructed rail link was 'intthe 
wrong p l ace'. He further stated that the Opposition, if 
elected, would "replace the rail link with a system of pipe­
lines and conveyors to transport coal and wheat"(53). The 
Parliamentary Opposition leader, on the other hand, stated that 
"a coalition Government would continue major Illawarra projects 
such as the rail link" (54).
In June 1984, however, the State Government announced a 
further infrastructure proposal - this time, a conveyor tunnel 
to carry coal down the escarpment - though the Minister for
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Public Works and Ports was quick to point out that the con­
veyor was "not a substitute for the Maldon-Dombarton - Port 
Kembla railway"(55). .
In this latest of a series of conveyor proposals, trucks 
would carry coal to the top of the conveyor tunnel from mines 
currently using road transport including Westcliff and 
Burragorang Valley mines. The conveyor would carry the coal to 
the Illawarra line whence it would be transported by rail to 
the coal loader. Although the precise location of the latest 
proposal had not been decided upon, it was reported that the 
Government was investigating four possible sites between 
Coalcliff and Bellambi.
The Status quo
In 1977 coal production in NSW was 47.8 million tonnes 
(56), of which 10.8 million tonnes was transported to Port 
Kembla and 6.1 million tonnes(57) exported through the port 
facilities. Of this export total, 1.4 million tonnes was 
carried by rail, 0.44 million tonnes on combined road and rail 
routes and 4.19 million tonnes(58) went by road (Table 4.1).
By 1982 production totals for the State had increased to 
64.8 million tonnes (59) with exports at 24.9 million tonnes
(60) . Coal exported through the port was 6.9 million tonnes
(61) and despite Government moves to switch coal to rail 
4.17 million tonnes, only marginally less than in 1977, went
by r o a d (62).
The global figures hide, however, differences m  regional 
growth patterns. Thus whilst production in the Singleton,
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TABLE 4.1: COAL MOVEMENT , BY MODE, FROM COLLIERIES TO
PORT K E M B L A * , 1977-78**
Mode
Colliery Destination By Rail By Road By Road and Rail
(tonnes)
Western District



























Coalcliff loader 934,600 289,800
steelworks 45,900
ER&S 20,100
Huntley loader 252,800 '
South Bulli " 1,072,600
South Clifton steelworks 46,000
Westcliff loader 360,600
Yellow Rock I 124,500
5,780,100 4,562,280 438,400
* Includes both the port loading facility , the steelworks and
the Electrolytic Refining and Smelting Company (ER&S).
** Source: Coal Export Strateqy Study (1979), Sydney.
122
North West, and Newcastle fields was expanding, production 
totals from the Burragorang Valley mines had declined - from
5.1 million tonnes in 1977 to 3.6 million tonnes in 1982.
South Coast mines, which produced 11.2 million tonnes in 1977 
had shown only a relatively slight increase to 12.95 million 
tonnes in 1982(63). Expansion of the Western field also 
occurred and although some of the increase was exported 
through Port Kembla and Newcastle, most of the Western export 
coal was channeled through Balmain. Of 5.6 million tonnes ex­
ported from the Western field in 1982-83, for example, 1.1 
million tonnes went through Newcastle and a similar amount 
was exported through Port Kembla, 3.47 million tonnes went 
through Balmain.
Certainly, the decline in tonnages from Burragorang 
Valley mines indicated the need for Government to examine care­
fully its infrastructure proposals. But it is clear that in­
frastructure location decisions have been conditioned, not by 
the mechanistic and value-free operations of the rational de­
cision-making paradigm but by the interactions of pressure 
groups in intricate - and sometimes not so intricate - 
patterns of 'power play' among themselves. The Government was 
unable to maintain a 2 million tonnes per year limit on road- 
hauled coal. The coal companies, which were under,pressure to 
transfer coal from road to rail, proposed and/or considered a 
number of alternative infrastructure proposals. They were, 
however, reluctant to invest in costly conveyor projects in 
the event that Government decided to press on with the promised 
rail link. Trade unions were mindful of their members employ 
ment prospects - the Transport Workers' Union promoted 'coal
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on road', the rail transport unions, 'coal on rail'.
There emerged, then, over the period between 1976 and 
1984, something of an impasse and balance of power. There 
existed a Government committed to a policy of rail transport 
of coal to export points; coal companies who, despite the nece­
ssity for efficient export transport arrangements, were unwill­
ing or unable to implement alternate proposals; trade unions 
whose members were under threat if any, or a number, of pro­
posals were implemented.
It is perhaps not surprising, then, that the pattern of 
transport infrastructure in 1984 (Figure 4.5) is almost identi­
cal to that for 1976 (Figure 4.1).
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CHAPTER 5: 'THE PLAY OF POWER': TRADE UNION PRESSURES
AND INFRASTRUCTURAL CHANGE
Governments and other decision makers are becoming in­
creasingly aware of the fact that the real test of power in the 
decision-making and policy process is whether or not policies 
are implemented (1) ; and implementation is almost certain to 
depend on the co-operation of participating groups and upon 
whether or not a compromise of opposing pressure group forces 
may be reached and an equilibrium maintained.
Certainly trade unions, with strong vested interests, in­
creasingly effective organisation and considerable power must 
now be seen as decisive elements within the policy and 
decision-making and implementation process. It is misleading 
however, to regard trade unions and the 'trade union movement 
as a necessarily close knit, cohesive and integrated 'power 
element' within the process. Under some conditions there is 
considerable, even total, cohesion; in others, the trade 
unions present a fragmented, conflicting pattern of participa 
tion, displaying high levels of inter-union and intra union 
dissent and with particular unions pursuing policies contrary 
to those held by the 'mainstream' union as well as to those 
being promoted by Government and/or the community in general.
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Moreover, trade union pressures may be either facilitat­
ing or disruptive to project implementation and action may be 
pursued with equal effort to expedite as well as oppose parti­
cular policy or projects.
This chapter focusses on the pressures which trade unions 
have exerted within the decision-making process to provide 
transport infrastructure for coal exports in southern NSW.
More particularly, it examines the hypothesis that although 
trade unions are effective and powerful elements in the 
decision-making process, trade-union co-operation may expedite 
the implementation process, though inter and intra-union 
rivalry may intensify the problem of conflict and inhibit its 
resolution.
Two case studies of separate, though related, decisions 
are examined to test the hypothesis. The first is concerned 
with a proposal, in June 1980, to construct a coal storage 
facility (coal bin) near Bellambi on the main southern rail 
line to Port Kembla. The bin was to enable coal from the 
South Bulli mine to be transported by rail, rather than by 
road, to the Port Kembla coal loader. The proposal was seen 
as an important element in the Government's policy to limit the 
amount of road-hauled coal to 2 million tonnes per year.
The second case study examines the conditions which 
surrounded the initial decision to construct a new coal loader 
at Port Kembla. It underlines the extent of positive co­
operation among various trade unions and between unions and 
Government and the nature of concessions and benefits required
to obtain them.
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The Bellambi Coal Bin Proposal and Inter-Union Conflict
The announcement by the State Labor Government that the 
location of the new coal loader was to be Port Kembla was 
almost unanimously welcomed by Wollongong residents. However, 
despite the general belief that the loader would be beneficial 
to Wollongong, particular concern was expressed about the pro­
blem of transporting coal by road.
It was proposed that the new loader would have road re- 
ceival facilities with a nominal capacity of 3.5 million 
tonnes per year (2). However, as a result of the widespread 
pressure exerted on the Government by most sections of the 
Wollongong community, and on the recommendation of the State 
Pollution Control Commission and the Illawarra Region Port and 
Railway Community Advisory Committee, road receival of coal to 
the new loader was to be restricted to 2 million tonnes(3).
To enable the Government to achieve this lower volume, it 
was subsequently announced that all South Bulli coal would be 
transported by rail and that road haulage of its coal to the 
Port Kembla loader would be illegal after the new loader 
became operational(4). At the time, South Bulli mine exported 
1.7 million tonnes per year(5), all of which was road hauled 
along the main street of the northern commercial and residen­
tial areas of Wollongong (see Chapter 3, Figure 3.4).
In order to transfer South Bulli coal to rail the Public 
Transport Commission, in June 1980, proposed the construction 
of a coal loading station near Bellambi. The proposal included 
a new stockpile at the colliery with a capacity of 120,000
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tonnes; and an underground conveyor system which would trans­
port the coal from the washery to an overhead rail loading 
bin positioned mid way between the residential areas of 
Woonona and Bulli(6).
Within a relatively short time there had been a good deal 
of community reaction and Bellambi Coal Company found that it 
had some support for the proposal but also considerable 
opposition. Figure 5.1 indicates the elements in the 'power 
play', which is discussed in the following paragraphs.
In December 1981, the State Government approved the con­
struction of the coal silo and rail loading facility. This 
was based on the outcome of a Public Inquiry in which there 
were 384 written submissions(7) from 53 community groups, 
statutory authorities, residents and trade unions(8).
The Department of Environment and Planning recommended 
that approval be given as soon as possible, enabling the facil­
ities to be commissioned for the opening of the new loader (9) . 
Furthermore, it argued that the Government's objective of re­
stricting road haulage to 2 million tonnes would not be 
possible without the construction of such a facility(10). The 
Illawarra Region Port and Railway Community Advisory Committee, 
a Government-appointed advisory committee, strongly supported 
the moves by the Government to establish the haulage of coal 
from Bellambi's South Bulli mine to Port Kembla by rail"(11).
Support for the proposal came from a variety of sources. 
The Bellambi Coal Company favoured the project because it had 
been informed that the continued road haulage of coal would b
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Figure 5.1: Elements in the 'power play' relating to the proposed 
establishment of the Bellambi coal bin.
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illegal after the completion of the new coal loader.
Government departments and local ALP Members of Parliament 
supported the Government's 'coal on rail' policy as well as 
the construction of the coal bin proposal since the facility 
would eliminate an estimated 500 coal truck journeys each 
d a y (12) .
Considerable opposition arose, however, from the Bellambi 
and Woonona residents, who initiated a public campaign exert­
ing pressure on State and local Governments. They maintained 
that the pollution and excessive noise that could be generated 
with the construction and operation of the project would have 
a serious detrimental effect on their homes(13).
The management of a clothing factory, the King Gee ~ 
factory, which was located adjacent to the proposed site, de­
manded that the Government abandon the proposal as "any worsen 
ing of an already serious dust problem would ruin the company 
operationsu . The management threatened that if the develop­
ment was implemented it may cause the company to close its 
existing premises resulting in the loss of three hundred jobs 
for its workers, mostly women. Similarly, International Home 
Products, another manufacturer located near b y , stated that any 
coal dust problem would result in the closure of specific oper 
ations which could affect its one hundred employees(14) .
The Clothing and Allied Trade Union, whose members were 
employed at the King Gee factory, opposed the construction on 
the basis that "coal dust would be a health hazard and would 
detract from their working conditions"(15). Furthermore, the 
closure of the two plants would result in the possible
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retrenchments of four hundred employees and would intensify an 
already serious unemployment problem in the Wollongong area.
The Wollongong City Council supported the development of 
the project and in August 1981, the Council's Environment 
Committee recommended that the South Bulli proposal be 
approved, subject to a number of conditions(16). The only 
Council member to actively campaign against the project was an 
Independent alderman, Brian Tobin.
Alderman Tobin, a real estate agent in Woonona, opposed 
location of the coal silo because he believed property values 
would be seriously affected. Interestingly, it appears likely 
that Alderman Tobin, in fact, intensified public concern when 
he revealed that there were 'undercover' plans to use the 
Bellambi facility as a major storage centre for the northern 
collieries and that six bins were planned, instead of one(17). 
However, the authenticity of Alderman Tobin's revelation was 
never verified and when he was challenged by the ALP Member for 
Corrimal Laurie Kelly to substantiate his claim and to divulge 
the source of his information, Tobin said that he had heard 
whispers of the gigantic scale of the project but was sworn to
secrecy"(18).
Although debate and discussion on the proposal was wide­
spread, it was trade union pressure which effectively preven­
ted the implementation of the project. Union influence arose 
from a number of opposing forces and the conflict which ensued 
between the unions and the Government not only demonstrates 
the influence trade unions may have on formal decision makers, 
but the intense inter-union conflict that occurred and
136
pressure exerted by trade unions on the Government, giving rise 
to conflicting and opposing goals.
The proposal was supported by the railway unions who per­
ceived that the transfer to rail would create employment 
opportunities for the Public Transport Commission employees.
The Transport Workers' Union (TWU) on the other hand, opposed 
the transfer to rail since it would eliminate the jobs of 
thirty truck drivers, who were members of the Transport 
Workers' Union. The Union's South Coast Secretary, said that 
although the Union believed that rail haulage should be used 
wherever possible provided it was economically viable and en­
vironmentally acceptable, the Union had a "very emotional 
interest" in the proposal and opposed it because it would lead 
inevitably to unemployment among its members(19).
In December 1981 the Transport Workers' Union placed a ban 
on the Bellambi bin project, effectively preventing construc­
tion of the conveyor and rail facilities. The ban prevented 
the delivery of concrete, steel, fuel and other essential mater­
ials to the construction site. Furthermore, no labour would be 
made available for the excavation works. The Union secretary 
stated that his union "had been reluctant to impose a ban but 
that it had an over-riding moral responsibility to look after 
the jobs of its members" 020). .
Instead of transferring coal to rail the Union proposed, 
as an alternative, that the Northern Distributor be built as a 
coal haulage road - a move which would, of course, prevent re 
dundancy of its members. The Union also opposed the transfer 
of Burragorang Valley coal to rail which, it was argued, would
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result in the loss of three hundred truck driving jobs. As an 
alternative itoproposed the construction of a freight-only 
road from the Burragorang Valley to Port Kembla. .
The Australian Railway Union (ARU) and the Australian 
Federated Union of Locomotive Enginemen (AFULE), in retaliation 
to the Transport Workers' Union ban, as well as the freight 
road proposal which would create possible retrenchments among 
railway employees, claimed that it "would resist any TWU 
attempt to endanger the jobs and livelihood of its members?. 
Furthermore, the Australian Federated Union of Locomotive 
Enginemen demanded that the Government stand by its commitment 
of restricting road haulage to two million tonnes per year and 
warned that it "would take industrial action if there (was) any 
further threat by the TWU to coal traffic on the South Coast" 
( 21 ) .
The South Coast Labour Council opposed the Transport 
Workers' Union ban because the TWU at the time, was not affil­
iated with the South Coast Labour Council. The Australian 
Railways' Union and the Australian Federated Union of 
Locomotive Enginemen were, however, members of the Council. 
Furthermore, it was argued by the Council that if South Bulli 
coal was not transferred to rail before the opening of the 
new loader, the jobs of 1,100 miners would be in jeopardy 
because of the TWU bans (22) since road haulage would not be 
permitted and the mine may be forced to cease production.
While the TWU was effectively preventing 
of the Bellambi facilities, other unions were 





For example, the maritime and railway unions, the Miners 
Federation and the Federated Engine Drivers and Firemen's 
Association presented an ultimatum to the Government that 
until the Bellambi project was commenced, there would be no 
manning arrangements made for the new coal loader.
On 4th November, 1982, after continued debate, the Premier 
announced that the road haulage of coal would be increased to 
four million tonnes per year since this was "necessary to pre­
serve every job possible in the mining and road transport in­
dustries". At the same time, Government approval was given for 
the Bellambi Coal Company to continue road haulage of South 
Bulli coal pending the company's decision to relocate its pit­
head west of the escarpment.
Immediate reaction to the Government's review of the road 
haulage limit came from the Australian Railways' Union which 
then threatened that it would ban coal deliveries to Port 
Kembla if the Government proceeded to raise the road limit to 
four million tonnes. The Union had also banned coal deliver­
ies to the loader for the official opening as well as suggest­
ing the poss i bi 1 i ty of imposing a ban on stage 2 of the loader.
The Australian Railways' Union State Councillor, in justifying 
the Union's action, stated that "the ARU has won conditions in 
this district for railway men in the rest of the State and we 
are not going to see truck drivers take our jobs from us. If 
Mr. Wran wants to take four million tonnes to the loader by 
road, he can take the lot by road"(23). At this point, and in 
response to the Australian Railways' Union threatened ban, the 
Transport Workers' Union Assistant Secretary, Harry Quinn, said
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that if the Australian Railways' Union imposed bans on stage 
2 of the Port Kembla coal loader, then transport workers would 
do all the work. Quinn further stated that the A R U 's only 
interest in the project appeared to be in stealing other 
worker's jobs(24).
Clearly, inter-union conflict was not only divisive, but 
also central to the failure to reach a compromise - and to put 
in place infrastructure which was designed to reduce road 
haulage of coal and its significant negative externalities. On 
the other hand, the perceived problems associated with the lo­
cation of a coal bin adjacent to residential areas were avoid­
ed and some jobs of truck drivers retained.
Despite the inter-union conflict that occurred, the case 
study clearly demonstrates the power and influence trade unions 
did exercise in policy-making, particularly during the attemp­
ted implementation stage.
The Port Kembla Coal Loader - Political Alliances and 
'Sweetheart' Deals
When the proposed Port Botany coal loader was abandoned 
and the Port Kembla site adopted, Wollongong residents, unlike 
those in residential suburbs around Botany Bay, appeared to 
accept the proposed new loader as a 'fait accompli . In fact, 
it appears that an active campaign was undertaken by the South 
Coast Labour Council and its secretary, Merv Nixon, to pro­
mote Port Kembla as the location for the facilities instead of 
Botany Bay.- Terry Stocker, the Assistant Secretary of the 
South Coast Labour Council, suggested, in fact, that "this (was)
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a victory for the South Coast Labour Council and its Secretary, 
Merv N i x o n " (25) .
However, although the location was readily accepted by 
the unions, it is apparent that in return for trade union 
co-operation concessions were made by the Government and that 
a 'sweetheart' deal was made between the Government and unions, 
and particularly with the South Coast Labour Council, which led 
to the construction of the loader without interruption from in­
dustrial disputes. In return the Government granted a number 
of union demands. Despite the fact that the location of Port 
Kembla was almost unanimously accepted, concern was widely ex­
pressed regarding environmental and coal transport issues and 
it became apparent to some groups that environmental protection 
and safeguards were to be 'inferior' to those proposed for 
Botany Bay. Environmental safeguards for the Botany Bay 
loader, for example, were to have included rail-only coal re- 
ceival facilities and covered coal storage bins. Port Kembla, 
on the other hand, was to have road receival facilities capable 
of handling 3.5 million tonnes a year as well as open stock­
piles. A further concern of several unions, particularly the 
Waterside Workers' Federation, was the actual location of the 
loader within the port, since it was proposed that the new 
loader would replace the existing multi purpose b e r t h (26)
(Figure 5.2). The multi purpose berth included ship repair 
facilities and was an important employment and operational 
centre in the port.
The South Coast Labour Council and the Wollongong City 
Council both insisted upon the rail transport of coal and
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Figure 5.2: Layout of the port of Port Kembla.
(A, Multi-purpose berth; B, New coal loader; 
C, Old coal loader)
Source BHPAIR, 17th June, 1982
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covered storage facilities (27). The Acting Secretary of the 
South Coast Labour C o u n c i l ,stated, for example, "I speak for 
the Labour Council and all affiliated unions when I say. we will 
accept nothing less than the protections originally planned for 
Botany Bay. We will insist on rail and not road transport and 
covered storage. Our environment has about had it now but we 
are not going to let the State Government make it worse by 
treating this area as second best just because it is a safe 
Labor d i s t r i c t " (28). The South Coast Labour Council further 
stated that "we don't want the coal loader until we get trans­
port facilities. The Council wants the environmental safe­
guards proposed for a loader at Botany Bay as a minimum and 
wants interest groups consulted at every stage of development" 
(29) .
In an attempt to force the Government to construct rail- 
only facilities and covered stockpiles, pressure was exerted 
on Wollongong City Council by the Chamber of Commerce to with­
hold approval of any building applications until guarantees 
were given by the Government of benefits at least equal to 
those promised for Botany B a y (30).
However, despite the fact that covered silos were proposed 
for Botany Bay and despite such vocal opposition, the Premier 
announced in November 1977 that the Government had decided 
upon open stockpiles for Port Kembla as "covered stockpiles 
would cost about $120 million"(31). The mining company, Kembla 
Coal & Coke, in supporting the Government decision, stated that 
"studies of operations in Canada, the USA, Japan and Europe had 
shown that covered bins were unnecessary and that open
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stockpiles protected by earth embankments and with water 
sprays were considered a d equate"(32).
But the possible elimination of the ship repair berth, 
and the retrenchment this would create among waterside workers, 
did become an issue among trade unions. In an attempt to re­
tain the ship repair facilities and the jobs associated with 
the berth, the Australian Metalworkers and Shipwrights' Union, 
the Amalgamated Metalworkers and the Federated Engine Drivers 
and Firemen's Association imposed a ban on the new loader until 
such time that the Government guaranteed alternative ship re­
pair facilities (33) .
The South Coast Labour Council supported the loader boy­
cott by the unions and in September 1978. the Council itself 
placed a total ban on the construction of the loader until 
certain conditions were met. These included a guarantee from 
the Government that alternate ship repair facilities would be 
provided; that all promised - associated rail facilities would 
be completed before the loader became operational and, that the 
State Government would give some guarantee that parts for the 
loader would be manufactured locally, that local contractors 
would be given preference and that predominantly local labour 
would be e m p l o y e d (34).
To further examine some of these problems and as a poss­
ible means of resolving the deadlock between the Government and 
unions, a public conference was held in Wollongong in December 
1978 which had been organised and agreed upon by the Deputy 
Premier following a community deputation to him led by the
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South Coast Labour Council. Attendance at the conference, 
chaired by Laurie Kelly, the Member of Parliament for Corrimal, 
included representatives of Government departments, unions, 
local and state Government politicians, employer organisations, 
as well as the Deputy P r e m i e r , (Jack Ferguson) and the then 
Minister for Planning and Environment (Paul Landa). As a re­
sult of this conference, a compromise was reached between 
Government and unions, who agreed to lift bans and to co­
operate as a quid pro quo for Government concessions. The 
Deputy Premier, whose portfolio included port matters, sugges­
ted that the Government would reduce the amount of road-hauled 
coal to 2 million tonnes per year; and provide alternate ship 
repair facilities within a new lay-up berth for which the 
Maritime Services Board had already allocated $10 million. He 
further suggested that much of the labour required would be 
provided locally and that local contractors and subcontractors 
would be used for the construction programme(35). These con­
cessions appear to have satisfied the trade unions because in 
January 1979, the South Coast Labour Council lifted the bans 
on the loader. In recommending that the bans be lifted, Nixon, 
the Council Secretary, stated that "the bans had achieved the 
building of a ship repair berth and the benefits flowing to 
that industry, the reduction of road haulage, rail transport 
improvements for the lllawarra which include commuter services, 
a monitoring committee for construction, loading and environ­
mental protection, the landscaping of the loader and jobs. 
jpqj, ^Lis reason X will be making a recommendation that the ban
be remov e d " (36).
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It is clear, then, that there was close alliance between 
unions and Government and that trade-offs were made which re­
sulted in modifications to port infrastructure. Covered coal 
storage bins however were not incorported in the loader design 
nor were rail improvements made. Moreover, in April 1982, 
Nixon reminded the Premier that the Government should keep its 
promise to limit road haulage of coal to 2 million tonnes 
because the unions "had kept to their end of the bargain by 
building stage 1 of the loader without one industrial dispute 
and they expected the State Government to live up to its under 
taking" (37) . Despite this the road hauled limit was raised by 
Government to 4 million tonnes, a move which was subsequently 
endorsed by Nixon who then argued that the 2 million tonnes 
limit could not have been enforced without placing at risk the 
1,200 jobs of South Bulli miners. Nixon further pointed out 
that the Government's revised road limit would still effective 
ly reduce the road haulage to Port Kembla from 5.5 million 
tonnes to 4 million tonnes a y e a r (38).
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CHAPTER 6: 'THE PLAY OF P O W E R 1: INTEREST GROUPS AND
INFRASTRUCTURAL CHANGE
Interest groups emerge in opposition to proposals which 
are perceived to generate negative externalities - detrimental 
effects on the environment, for example, or declines in pro­
perty values, or traffic hazards or loss of jobs(l). Not in­
frequently, however, there is a 'hidden agenda' for interest 
groups so that stated goals and underlying motives may be sig­
nificantly different (2) . Certainly, opposition to infrastruc­
ture proposals related to the movement of coal from mines to 
the loading facility at Port Kembla has led to the creation of 
a whole range of i n t e r e s t — or pressure, lobby, resident 
action-groups in the Illawarra. Not all have achieved all 
their goals but their influence, though indirect in the sense 
that they do not initiate or veto proposals as Dahl suggested(3), 
has often been considerable. Those groups which have been 
most successful - that is, who have achieved their stated 
goals, however defined - appear to be those who have strong 
and direct links with other trade unions or political parties 
or who have developed close alliances with individual politi­
cians or local party branches. Controversial issues may then 
become election issues or part of a political platform or 
party policy. The nature of the issue, too, is obviously 
important.
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To pursue the mechanisms by which interest groups become 
involved in the decision-making process and in an attempt to 
assess their effectiveness, it was hypothesized that although 
the influence of interest groups varies, success is closely 
related to the extent and intensity of political alliances and 
to the nature of the issues involved. To test the hypothesis, 
four interest groups were chosen from among the many which were 
created to deal with coal transport-related issues. The groups 
varied in size, resources and the particular issues addressed. 
Each is discussed in the following sections.
The South Coast Organisation Opposing Pollution (SCOOP)
The South Coast Organisation Opposing Pollution (SCOOP) 
was formed in October 1970, in opposition to the proposal by 
Clutha to construct an offshore coal loader at Coalcliff. The 
proposal included the construction of a private railway line 
from the Burragorang Valley to coal stockpiles at Maddens 
Plains. It was proposed that an enclosed conveyor system would 
then transport the coal down the escarpment to the coast near 
Coalcliff to an offshore ship loading terminal (the proposal 
is discussed at some length in Chapter 3 and this section ; 
should be read in conjunction with that discussion).
The initial members of SCOOP were residents of Austinmer and 
other northern suburbs of Wollongong and their opposition cam­
paign was motivated, ostensibly, by environmental concerns - 
the anticipated detrimental effects of the construction of the 
loader on the local coastline, the b e a ches(4) and the potential 
pollution created by the stockpiles and the loader(5).
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However, the power of SCOOP as an interestgroup lay in 
its close alliance with the Australian Labor Party, both State 
and Federal. In fact, SCOOP was very much a creation of the 
ALP. It evolved from a decision by Les Johnson, the Labor ' 
Member of the House of Representatives for Hughes, the Federal 
Electorate in which the Clutha company proposed to locate the 
project, and the Hughes Federal Electorate Council, to esta­
blish a committee to enquire into Clutha's activities. The 
ALP provided SCOOP with finance, an organisational structure 
within the area and a means of contacting ALP branch me m b e r s (6). 
In fact, membership of SCOOP was restricted to ALP me m b e r s (7).
The alliance between SCOOP and the ALP, as well as a 
number of trade unions, including the railway unions and the 
Transport Workers' Union, was the means by which local pressure 
group influence was exerted on the State Liberal Government and 
the Clutha company. Pressure exerted by the alliance led to 
the abandonment of the proposal and the repeal of the special 
Act of Parliament which had been passed enabling the develop­
ment of the project. The adoption of the cause by the ALP led 
to the issue becoming part of the ALP election platform and 
became, in effect, a means by which the ALP sought to gain ad­
vantage over the then State Liberal Government.
In the State election in February 1971, the ALP members 
for Corrimal and Heathcote, Laurie Kelly and Rex Jackson, in­
creased their already large majorities(8). In the electorate 
of Wollongong, the ALP candidate, Eric Ramsay, defeated by 
79 votes (9) the sitting Liberal member/ , Jack Hough, who had 
defended the Clutha propo s a l (10). Subsequently, this group was
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able to focus considerable attention on the issue in State 
Parliament where it became a source of questions, motions of 
urgency and adjournment debates.
The Anti-Clutha campaign had the active support not only 
of unions and the NSW Labour Council, but it was able to gain 
support from a number of academics who were either anxious to 
use the organisation to further ALP policy or to clarify some 
of the more difficult legal and/or environmental problems - 
or both.
There was some expectation that, even after the abandon­
ment of the proposed project by Clutha in February 1972, SCOOP 
would continue to act as an environmental interest group and 
that "although SCOOP membership was restricted to ALP people... 
membership would be broadened"(11). However, it was not long 
after abandonment by Clutha of its plans, that the group was 
disbanded.
The Wollongong Inner City Safeguards Association (WICSA)
During the 1970s a pressure group was formed which cam­
paigned successfully for almost a decade to remove heavy trucks, 
particularly coal trucks, from the streets of the inner city of 
Wollongong. '
The Wollongong Inner City Safeguards Association (WICSA) 
initially comprised residents of Bourke and Corrimal Streets 
who based their campaign on the problems associated with coal 
traffic in inner city streets - pollution, noise, road safety 
hazards and environmental problems. Moreover, WICSA members
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believed that, with expanding coal production and markets, the 
coal truck problem would be intensified as coal exports in­
creased .
In 1970 the Port Kembla coal loader handled 2.6 million 
tonnes of coal and by 1971 this had increased to 3.2 million 
tonnes(12). More than sixty percent of this export coal was 
transported by road and the route used by truck drivers was 
either Flinders Street - Keira Street or through Bourke 
Street - Corrimal Street (Figure 6.1). It was estimated that 
in 1970 three coal trucks each minute, or between 1,500 and 
1,800 coal trucks each day travelled along the Wollongong 
inner city s t reets(13). Coal trucks had previously used the 
Smith Street - Corrimal Street route, but when Smith Street 
residents had opposed this practice, Bourke Street had been 
declared a 'main road' by the Department of Main Roads and it 
became a legitimate heavy transport route, despite the fact 
that it was a high rise, high density residential area.
In order to resolve the problem, WICSA had initially 
called for the construction of a drift from the top of the 
escarpment, as well as an underground conveyor which would 
carry the coal to the loader. This proposal would not have 
eliminated all coal trucks from the public roads since coal 
from the northern suburbs, including that from South Bulli 
mine, would still be road hauled; but it would have alleviated 
the problem considerably since all road hauled Burragorang 
Valley and Western coal to Port Kembla would have been rerouted.
This was not, however, considered a viable proposition by 
the then State Liberal Government and, WICSA called for the
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Figure 6.1: Coal truck routes through Wollongong
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construction of an alternative route, the Masters Road devia­
tion. At the time, although a Wollongong bypass had been con­
structed, truck drivers were unwilling to use this route, 
because it lengthened the journey from the mines to the port 
by approximately two kilometres. Although planning had been 
carried out on the Masters Road deviation, which would provide 
a four-lane link road instead of the existing two-lane bridge 
from the expressway to Port Kembla, implementation of the plan 
had not occurred.
WICSA further called for the relocation of the weigh­
bridge, from its location in Fairy Meadow to a site at Port 
Kembla. At the time, trucks drove down Mt. Ousley Road and 
turned left on the Princes Highway to the weighbridge at 
Cabbage Tree Lane. After leaving the weighbridge, they would 
then cross the Princes Highway, turn right and proceed along 
it until the Bourke Street intersection (Figure 6.1).
WICSA was formed at a public meeting in October 1970 at 
which Rex Connor, Laurie Kelly, the ALP member for Corrimal 
and Eric Ramsay, then the President of the South Coast Labour 
Council and the ALP candidate-elect for the seat of Wollongong, 
attended. The Independent Mayor of Wollongong, Ernie Ford, 
and the Liberal member for the electorate of Wollongong, Jack 
Hough, did not attend.
WICSA initially approached members of Parliament and the 
local Wollongong City Council in order to gain their support 
in having coal trucks diverted. There was, however, some con­
fusion among local and State Government departments as to
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which agencies actually had the power and jurisdiction to 
remove the coal trucks from the inner city streets. A number 
of State Government departments, including the Department of 
Main Roads, the Department of Transport as well as the 
Minister for Local Government, claimed that it was beyond 
State Government jurisdiction and that it was a local 
Government matter (14). On the other hand, the Wollongong City 
Council claimed that the removal of coal trucks from Bourke 
Street would require State Government legislation. Moreover, 
the Lord Mayor appeared not overly sympathetic to the resi­
dents' needs and believed that it was necessary to use all 
three routes in order to create minimum congestion, until the 
Masters Road deviation was complete and all trucks would use 
the e x p r e s s w a y (15).
In order to combat the State Liberal Government's inaction 
in implementing the plan and in order to strengthen their cam­
paign, WICSA appealed to, and obtained support from, the 
Australian Labor Party. The result was that the leader of the 
State ALP Opposition, Pat Hills, stated that an ALP Government, 
if elected, would make an immediate start on the Masters Road 
link and would compel coal trucks to use the by-pass when it 
was completed; would promote a greater use of rail; and would 
insist on restoration of the private rail line to South Bulli 
c o l l i e r y (16).
The Liberal Government 
WICSA demands, arguing that 
truck drivers. Furthermore 
actively opposed WICSA(17).
refused, however, to act on the 
it would create unemployment among 
the local Liberal Member, had 
On the other hand, Ramsay, the
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ALP and Opposition candidate, was sympathetic to the residents' 
demands and promised further support, if elected. As a result, 
a firm alliance was formed between WICSA and Ramsay and during 
the 1971 State Government election campaign, WICSA members 
actively lobbied on his b e h a l f (18). In the State Government 
election in February 1971, coal transport in the Wollongong 
area became anrimportant election issue and, although the State 
Liberal Government retained office, Ramsay defeated the sitting 
Liberal Member by 79 v o t e s (19).
' WICSA continued to exert pressure on the Government in 
various ways - with a petition containing 2,500 signatures; by 
numerous appeals to politicians and cabinet ministers; and by 
a threatened 'sit in' and a proposal by residents to create a 
barricade across Bourke Street to prevent coal truck access to 
the street. Despite this, coal trucks continued to use the 
inner city streets and the Government did not introduce legis­
lation preventing it. Nor did it commence the Masters Road 
deviation.
The WICSA group was opposed, however, by mine companies 
and the Transport Workers' Union - the Manager of South Bulli 
mine, for example, continued to instruct truck drivers to use 
the shortest route to the loader while it was legal to do so 
(the shortest route was via Bourke Street); and the Transport 
Workers' Union Secretary also called on TWU members to black 
list the Wollongong jewellery business of the WICSA President.
The State Liberal Government was defeated in 1976 and the 
new Minister for Transport, Peter Cox, acted quickly and 
suggested that contracts for the Masters Road deviation would
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be let within twelve weeks(20). In fact, the deviation was ' 
completed in September 1978.
Coal companies were requested by the Government to in­
struct their drivers to use the by-pass voluntarily though a 
warning was given that if the request was not adopted legisla­
tion would be introduced, making its use compulsory(21).
WICSA was formally disbanded in 1982. It had achieved 
its aims through a dogged persistence of action and influence 
and its close political alliance with an Opposition party mem­
ber who, fortuitously, became a member of a new Government.
The Camden Committee Promoting Road Transport
Although there has been widespread opposition to the con­
tinued road haulage of coal throughout the urban areas, the 
announcement in 1979 by the State Government to limit the 
volume of road-hauled coal to 2 million tonnes generated some 
opposition to the transfer-to-rail policy and a number of in­
terest groups appeared. One of these was the Camden Committee 
Promoting Road Transport, which was concerned especially with
effects of the policy on the Burragorang Valley mines and 
workers and is examined in this section.
The decision to restrict road receival at the loader 
meant that only Westcliff, Yellow Rock and Avon mines would be 
permitted to continue road haulage and all other mines, in­
cluding those in the Burragorang Valley and South Bulli, would 
not be permitted to continue road haulage.
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The Burragorang Valley mines, in particular, would be ad­
versely affected by the decision. The Valley, since the mid 
1970s, had undergone a gradual decline, despite the fact that 
most mining areas in NSW had experienced a growth period - coal 
production in the Valley fell from 5.1 million tonnes in 1976 
to 3.5 million tonnes in 1982(22). Moreover Valley mines were 
not linked directly with rail facilities and export coal was 
transported by a combination of truck and train to Balmain or
by truck to Port Kembla. The problem had further intensified
because export of coal from the Western fields, which had pre­
ference at the Balmain loader, had undergone a marked in­
crease - exports from these mines through Balmain increased
from 0.9 million tonnes in 1977-78 to 3.5 million tonnes in
1982-83(23). As a result, the Balmain loader was working at 
near capacity levels and increasing quantities of Burragorang 
Valley coal was being road-hauled to Port Kembla. On a number 
of occasions during 1978, when both the Balmain and Port Kembla 
loaders were working at capacity levels Clutha, in order to 
meet its export commitments, loaded coal at Glenlee for trans 
port by rail to the Newcastle loader(24).
At the time of the Government decision to restrict road 
haulage, approximately 4.8 million tonnes of Burragorang Valley 
coal was being road hauled to Port Kembla. The Clutha company 
and the road haulage industry for Burragorang Valley coal 
provided jobs for approximately three hundred truck drivers - 
about one hundred of these were Clutha employees and the bal­
ance were owner drivers (25) - and these jobs would be made 
redundant once the transfer to rail was implemented.
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Residents of the Burragorang Valley and surrounding areas 
believed that the "loss of the truck trade would be a crippling 
blow to the town's (Camden) e c o n o m y " (26)» Furthermore, concern 
was not restricted to the survival of the coal haulage indus­
try. It was felt that mine workers and coal companies would 
also be affected, since it was proposed that no new mines would 
be permitted to open west of the escarpment unless they were 
linked to rail. This meant that unless a rail link was provi­
ded, there was little chance of increasing production in the 
Valley. It was argued that retrenchments would occur among 
mirie workers if the company had to curtail production and if it 
was not permitted to continue road haulage of coal until a 
suitable alternate mode of transport was implemented. This 
could intensify an already serious employment problem - e.g. 
employment of mine workers in the Burragorang Valley had 
declined from 1,500 in 1979 to 1,157 in 1983(27).
Concern about the future of the Valley led to the forma­
tion of a number of interest groups which urged the Government 
to abandon its decision of limiting road transport. The 
interest groups included representatives from coal companies, 
the Camden Chamber of Commerce, the Camden and Wollondilly 
Councils, miners, truck drivers, the Camden division of the 
Road Transport Association, the Transport Workers' Union, the 
Camden Coal and Bulk Haulage Limited.
In order to maintain road haulage, the groups proposed 
that a freeway be constructed - the F5h - which would be a 
link between the F5 freeway at Wilton and the F6 at Mt. Ousley. 
p̂ fj'-glgLt corridor or a conveyor would carry the coal from the
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top of the escarpment to Port Kembla (see.Chapter 4).
The State ALP Government did not at first respond and 
rejected the F5^ proposal - in November 1979, for example, the 
Government assured the South Coast Labour Council that 
"the F5^ was not being reconsidered and was unlikely to b e " (28) 
and in February 1980, the Premier had stated that "the 
Government had no intention of re-opening the debate on the 
proposed F5 h and freight corridor" and had stated that the pro­
posal was "as dead as a d o d o " (29).
■ The real force behind the groups came from their alliance 
with the Transport Workers' Union, which had a vested interest 
in the issue since the truck drivers, whose jobs were threat­
ened, were members of the TWU. In fact, it was largely as a 
result of the TWU ban on the Bellambi coal silo project, to­
gether with Government inaction in the implementation of rail 
facilities, that led to abandonment of the Government policy 
of a 2 million tonnes road haulage limit and which allowed the 
continued road transport of coal.
Certainly the Camden-based pressure group and the 
Transport Workers' Union were mutually reinforcing and though 
the F5^ freeway has failed to emerge, consistent pressure - 
as well as the lack of appropriate rail alternatives - have 
ensured continued road haulage of large volumes of export coal.
The Community Transport Concern Association , (CTC)
Some pressure groups have been formed in order to promote 
specific causes and when their demands have been satisfied, as
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in the case of WICSA and S C O O P , the groups have disbanded.
Other pressure groups, while promoting a specific ideal, may 
exert pressure on the Government or other formal decision 
makers, to ensure that policy is implemented according to plan. 
These may exercise a dual function and may adopt a monitoring 
and 'watchdog' type role as well.
The Community Transport Concern Association is a pressure 
group concerned not exclusively with coal transport but which 
promotes, in general, transport policies which are efficient 
and safe. Because of the accident hazards on public roads 
associated with coal trucks, it promoted the initial restric­
tion of road haulage of coal, with the ultimate aim of 
abolishing road transport altogether.
CTC was formed in 1979 and evolved from an informal r 
group - Coal Transport Concern and the Wollongong Inner City 
Safeguards Association. Whilst WICSA had successfully cam­
paigned to remove coal trucks from the inner city streets the 
CTC formation was a reaction to coal trucks in the outer city. 
The group was formed in response to the State Government deci­
sion to construct a new coal loader at Port K e m b l a a n d  the 
abandonment of the earlier Government plan (1977) to construct 
new rail facilities from Maldon/Douglas Park to Port Kembla.
The formation of CTC occurred during a period when wide­
spread opposition to coal trucks on public roads occurred. In 
1979, 6.3 million ton n e s (30) of coal had been exported through 
Port Kembla and in excess of 4 million tonnes had been trans­
ported to the loader by road. As a result of a series of 
fatal accidents involving private vehicles and coal trucks,
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which were frequently found to be mechanically unsound and 
travelling at excessive speeds (31), opposition to road haulage 
of coal had intensified considerably, particularly in view of 
the fact that the daily vehicle kilometres travelled by coal 
trucks on roads west of the escarpment increased by about one 
third from 1977 to 1979. Furthermore, coal truck movements at 
the Port Kembla coal loader had increased by 50 percent during 
the same period(32).
The objectives of the Association included the following -
(i) to advise and accellerate the State
Government action in implementing trans­
port of coal by rail or means other than 
road transport;
(ii) to seek as soon as possible an improved
public transport system for the Illawarra;
(iii) to promote transport policies which are 
safe, efficient and energy s aving(33).
The Association 
road haulage of coa 
of eliminating coal 
order to meet these 
the construction of 
as the St. Mary's - 
lines would remove
campaigned for the immediate reduction of 
1 to 2 million tonnes per year with the aim 
trucks from public roads altogether. In 
objectives, the Association had, supported 
the Maldon - Port Kembla railway as well 
Glenlee line (see Figure 4.1). These new 
all Burragorang Valley and Western fields
coal from public roads.
As well as supporting the rail transport of coal, CTC has
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also called for the electrification of the Illawarra line and 
has actively campaigned for the provision of a more efficient 
public transport system. .
Although the group does not participate directly in 
decision-making, it exerts pressure on Government and decision 
makers through use of the media; by placing pressure on local, 
state and federal politicians; by undertaking surveys and 
publicising the results; and by sponsoring petitions. In March 
1984, the Association released to the local newspaper a confi­
dential report which had been prepared by the ombudsman upon 
request by the CTC and the South Coast Conservation Society.
The groups had requested the investigation of complaints about 
the Port Kembla coal loader. The timing of the release of the 
report, nine days before a State Government election, embarrass 
ed the State Government, which took immediate action to ensure 
that environmental protection devices would be functioning as 
required.
Apart from monitoring environmental protection at the 
loader and calling for the early construction of the Maldon - 
Port Kembla rail, CTC, in its campaign to reduce road haulage 
of coal, also supported the proposal for the construction of 
the Bellambi coal bin which was designed to remove South Bulli
coal from the roads. The group also urged the reinstate
of the Illawarra Region Port and Railway Community 
Advisory Committee after it had been disbanded in November 1983 
by Eric Bedford, the Minister for Environment and Planning.
Unlike other pressure groups, such as SCOOP and the Camden
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groups promoting coal on road, there has been no overt alli­
ance between the Association and a particular political party 
or with trade unions. Although CTC has frequently voiced 
criticism of the State ALP Government and periodically there 
has been considerable hostility between it and the Government, 
this has not occurred for ideological reasons or as a result 
of the group's alignment with a particular political platform. 
CTC action is usually based on its perceptions of broken pro­
mises by Government.
Unlike SCOOP, where membership was restricted to ALP 
members, CTC has had a politically balanced executive. De s p i t e - 
this, it appears that the State ALP considered the Association 
to be a threat because in December 1981, the ALP State Council 
declared CTC a 'proscribed organisation' and that it was 
illegal for ALP members to belong to it. Moreover, ALP members 
were required to resign from CTC or face party expulsion(34).
The ultimatum led, however, to only one letter of resignation 
(35). Interestingly, although declared a proscribed organisa­
tion by the State ALP, CTC was invited to make submissions on 
transport policy to the then Federal ALP Shadow Transport 
Minister, Peter Morris.
The Community Transport Concern Association also performs 
a function as a monitoring body and acts as a 'watchdog' on 
Government and semi-Government bodies in an endeavour to ensure 
that environmental safeguards and prescribed regulations and 
safety measures are met. In 1983, Community Transport Concern, 
together with the South Coast Conservation Society, approached 
the ombudsman concerning the alleged breaches of the Clean Air
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Act and the Environmental Protection and Assessment Act. This 
complaint was a result of continued pollution and dirty access 
roads to the coal loader; the continuation of the use of. the 
'illegal' stockpiles and the resumption of the use of the old 
coal loader. Furthermore, the rail receival unit had been 
modified by the Maritime Services Board without any development 
application being lodged with the Wollongong City Council.
As a result of CTC action, an investigation was carried 
out by the ombudsman who found that since November 1982, when 
the Maritime Services Board had taken over the coal loader, it 
had failed to observe the requirements' and standards laid down 
for the loader's operation. The result had been unagglomerated 
coal, unwashed trucks, ineffective spraying, dirty roads and 
new, unprotected stockpiles. It was found that "tonnes of coal 
dust fell on the city of Wollongong, mainly because the new 
loader was not operating in the way it was designed to d o " (36).
An interest group such as CTC cannot directly remedy de­
ficiencies; but by drawing attention to breaches of prescribed 
safeguards and regulations and by undertaking public and media 
campaigns, it can and does exert pressure on Governments and 
operating bodies.
Voter Reaction and Interest Group Spin-offs: a Note
For the most part interest groups do not have the ability 
to initiate or veto proposals; nor do they often have the 
resources or organisational structures of trade unions. Their 
influence, in fact, depends largely upon their resources and
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organising ability and upon their alliance with other groups 
who may directly influence decision makers, such as political 
parties, individual politicians or trade unions. But there 
may also be significant and effective 'spin-off' effects on 
the 'ordinary' voter which derive from the politicisation of 
particular issues. Constant media exposure of controversial 
problems tends to 'sensitise' - either positively or 
negatively - the voter. In the US, Lindblom, for example, ha 
suggested that the influence of the voter on policy-making is 
relatively insignificant and that the ballot is not an effec­
tive instrument of citizen participation in policy-making(37) 
Whether or not this is still the case in the US is not known, 
but this study of coal transport infrastructural decision­
making suggests, in fact, that this 'sensitisation' effect 
which interest groups and their actions have on voters, parti 
cularly of c o u r s e ,in margimal electorates, is of particular 
importance. The Botany Bay coal loader, for example, became 
not just an issue for members of interest groups, but a much 
wider issue in the 1976 State elections; the SCOOP issue cer­
tainly politicised a large proportion of voters in the 
Illawarra electorates; and the C T C , WICSA and other interest 
group campaigns have ensured that coal—related transport and 
infrastructural problems are, and are likely to remain, 
important election issues.
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CHAPTER 7 : SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study has attempted to demonstrate that the provision 
and location of transport infrastructure, and particularly that 
infrastructure designed to serve the movement of export coal 
from mines to southern NSW through the port of Port Kembla, re­
flects the complexity of the policy-making and planning process 
and' of.1.'the decision-making mechanism. It has attempted to 
show, also, that the decision-making process, rather than con­
forming to the simplistic positivist normative model in which 
all options are clearly defined and all judgements rational and 
value-free, reflects the power relationships among elements in 
the process and that decisions are the direct outcome of com­
plex political processes. Further, it became evident from the 
first stages of the study that neither classical location 
theory nor the Logical Positivist paradigm generally, could 
adequately account for the locational patterns of coal-related 
transport infrastructure in the region.
Meinig ( 1) , and somewhat later Eliot H u r s t (2) , for example, 
had emphasised the need for a clearer appreciation of the 
'political' element in transport studies and Eliot Hurst had 
certainly stressed the inadequacies of the Logical Positivist 
paradigm. Even more recent studies, such as that of Rimmer 
and Black (3) in examining the impact of containerisation on
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landuse in the Sydney region, have failed to adequately demon­
strate an appropriate conceptual framework or mechanism for 
the decision-making process. Government, or State intervention, 
the authors argue, occurs in order to ameliorate "dislocations 
in urban form produced as a result of anarchical decision­
making by private firms and individuals"(4).
However, the process is anarchical only if measured accor­
ding to the criteria of the normative rational model; firms and 
individuals make decisions which are 'rational' given the con­
straints within which they operate, as Muir and Paddison point 
out. Further, Rimmer and Black suggest that "the State inter­
venes because of unco-ordinated decisions by individual firms" 
(5). This is clearly not the case; the State does not lie 
outside the decision-making process but is in fact part of it.
It is, moreover, as 'unco-ordinated' as any other decision 
maker within the overall decision-making process, as Chapter 4 
of this study has shown. The process is, however, both dis­
jointed and incremental, as Lindblom has suggested.
Conflict-oriented explanations, though recognising the in­
herent political nature of the locational decision-making 
process, also tend to be too narrow and focus concern not on 
the whole process of decision-making but on that part which 
results in conflict - and even then, on the resulting external­
ities of conflict.
Since the mid 1970s some 'political' geographers have 
espoused concepts in political science, resulting in a more 
adequate approach to locational decision-making. These in­
clude Muir and P a d d i s o n (6) and G r a n t (7) in the UK and L o g a n (8)
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in Australia, all of whom have 
appropriate to the question of 
coal transport infrastructure, 
ted, in general terms, in this
offered a framework more 
the provision and location of 
Their approach has been .adop- 
s t u d y .
In Chapter 2 of this study a conceptual framework was 
developed to account more specifically for infrastructure 
location decision-making, underlining the inherently political 
nature of the process and the complexity of power relations 
and interactions among different elements. It showed, too, 
th$t the process is a dynamic one, with projects proceeding to 
implementation or being modified or abandoned. It further 
stressed the two-phase structure of the decision-making process 
with an implementation phase following the decision phase.
With the exception of Logan there has, in fact, been 
little discussion in the geographic literature of the actual 
implementation of decisions and either a distinction is not 
made between the planning and implementation stages of the pro­
cess as occurs, for example, with Lindblom(9) or as in the case 
of the 'conflict1 theorists the focus is placed on the con se 
quences of implementation.
Yet this study has clearly demonstrated, particularly in 
Chapters 5 and 6, that the decision-making process Often breaks 
down when the implementation of a decision is attempted. The 
recognition of the failure of the process during this latter 
stage suggests a number of important implications for both the 
decision makers and the policy-making process. There is, for 
example, a need to incorporate public and pressure group
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interest during the actual planning phase rather than to leave 
it until the implementation phase.
This is not just simply a recognition that there exists a 
need for greater 'public participation' in planning, as Rimmer 
and Black have suggested in their 1981 paper. Rather, it lays 
stress on the structure of the decision-making process per se 
as a power-based, conflict-ridden mechanism and one in which a 
'rational' decision will reflect a compromise rather than an 
optimum solution.
* This suggests that it may be useful to explore, even 
somewhat tentatively in this context, an extension of the 
model developed in Chapter 2 (Figure 2.2) within a normative 
framework. Figure 7.1 proposes such a framework.
The model suggests that proposals will be initiated as 
b e f o r e , though even from the earliest stages of proposal for­
mulation it is likely that, with a clearer appreciation of 
decision-making mechanisms, project initiators will seek 
'advice' more widely than hitherto. Formal procedures for 
presentation and evaluation of proposals may be similar. But 
since the implementation of decisions has been shown to be 
dependent upon power relationships among the decision-making 
elements, it is important that a 'concensus-seeking * strategy 
(Figure 7.1) operates within the actual planning phase, rather 
than in the implementation stage. Such a 'strategy' may be 
relatively simple or it may be long and tedious, but if 
decisions are to be implemented it is a necessary procedure.
Clearly, this procedure may not eliminate pressures from
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Figure 7.1: The coal transport infrastructure _dec is ion-making process: a normative
model.
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powerful elements in the decision-making process - influential 
interest groups and/or unions, indeed any group, will still 
seek to achieve specific goals. But it is likely to provide a 
more positive, pragmatic context than is otherwise possible.
In due course, a decision will be made (Figure 7.1) and 
projects will be implemented. It will be known before imple­
mentation is attempted whether or not pressure groups will 
oppose the construction and whether or not opposition will be 
sufficiently powerful to the extent that it can prevent devel­
opment being carried out. As a result, the instances where 
decisions fail to be implemented because of union bans, for 
example, will be considerably reduced, if not completely 
elim i n a t e d .
This revised planning procedure will not eliminate com­
pletely opposing pressure group activity during the implemen 
tation stage and some residual power play will remain (Figure 
7.1). Since decision-making involves attaining a compromise 
and concensus, all goals of all participants may not, indeed 
will not, be fulfilled equally and there will, therefore, 
remain an element of discontent with those groups or sections 
of groups whose demands have not been fully satisfied. There 
is likely to be, for example, some residual power play in the 
event of intra union conflict where the main body of the 
union, possibly least effected by a proposal, may adopt a par­
ticular stance which is opposed by the union's minority 
section which will be directly effected. This could occur, 
for example, in conditions similar to those which caused a 
division in the Miners' Federation when it opposed development
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of Clutha's proposal for an offshore loader. In this case the 
Federation favoured state ownership of coal loading facilities 
whereas the Burragorang Valley miners, directly affected by 
the project, supported its development.(see Chapter 3).
The normative model suggests a more pragmatic and effec­
tive decision-making process. It implies, too, co-ordination 
and integration of the planning process. Certainly these are 
important characteristics and much of the decision-making 
process concerned with the provision and location of coal- 
oriented transport infrastructure has been characterised by 
the absence of co-ordinated and integrated planning, particu­
larly at Government level. Simblist(10), for example, in the 
Report of the Botany Bay Port and Environment Inquiry noted 
that "the Inquiry considered that the largest single source of 
concern which became manifest before it was that related to a 
lack of full scale planning" (.11) . A similar concern was also 
expressed by the Illawarra Region Port and Railway Community 
Advisory Committee when it suggested that it was clear that 
there was a serious lack of co-ordinated and comprehensive 
planning for the winning, transportation and handling of the 
regional coal resources" (12) . Moreover as Chapter 4 has demon 
strated, Government ability or willingness to allocate 
resources to enable implementation to be carried out as a 
co-ordinated and integrated process, was also a major factor.
Locational decision-making is complex and its analysis 
requires a less positivist approach than that suggested by 
K a u f m a n n (13) for example. For Wildavsky(14) policy analysis 
is both an art and a craft; and Lindblom(15) has labelled it
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'the science of muddling through'. But however it is descri­
bed, this study has suggested that to properly understand the 
locational patterns and structure of coal-oriented transport 
infrastructure in southern NSW, it is necessary to understand 
the nature of the decision-making processes involved.
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